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LENDER LIABILITY:
BREACH OF GOOD FAITH IN LENDING
AND RELATED THEORIES
I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional relationship of lender and borrower has
undergone a number of changes in recent times, and the theory of
bad faith in lending has emerged with full force. Recent cases have
taken traditional common-law theories of liability and applied them
to the borrower-lender relationship.1 The lender may also be liable
for violation of the statutory requirement of good faith imposed by
the Uniform Commercial Code.2  Furthermore, there is an
emerging area of law which applies nontraditional theories of
liability based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
3
This Note addresses the emerging theory of lender liability for
lack of good faith. The first section will address the issue of good.
faith as it is found under the Uniform Commercial Code.4 The
second section will explore liability based upon breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which may allow
for contract or tort recovery of damages. 5 Finally, the traditional
tort theories of liability that have been imposed upon the lender in
borrower-lender cases will be addressed.
6
1. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984)
(lender liable for fraud, duress, and tortious interference).
2. See U.C.C. S 1-203 (1978) (obligation of good faith imposed on every contract or duty under
the Code); see, eg., Van Bibber v. Norris, 404 N.E.2d 1365, 1377-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (lender
breached duty of good faith when it declared loan in default and repossessed collateral without
sufficient grounds for insecurity).
3. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 763 (6th Cir. 1985) (lender liable for
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing after discontinuing financing without
notice).
4. See U.C.C. S 1-203 (1978); infra notes 12-111 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 155-254 and accompanying text.
t). See tnjra notes 255-340 and accompanying text.
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While this Note examines contract and tort theories of liability
only, it should be noted that other areas of the law may also give
rise to a cause of action against the lender for its actions in regard to
customer's debts, but liability based on those theories is beyond the
scope of this Note. 7
II. THE CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENT OF GOOD
FAITH
The relationship between debtor and creditor is in large part
contractual in nature.8 The parties' agreement is subject to the
application of a contractual requirement of good faith. 9 This good
faith requirement may be required by the Uniform Commercial
Code, or it may be implied by general contract law.' 0 Either way,
the concept of good faith in the performance of a contract creates
boundaries beyond which the creditor must not stray. I'
A. GOOD FAITH AND THEUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The Uniform Commercial Code defines good faith as
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.' ' 2 The
scope of the good faith standard under the Uniform Commercial
Code is set out by section 1-203.' Section 1- 203 expressly adds the
requirement of good faith to the terms of any contract to which the
7. The lender may face liability under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. 1986). Additionally, the activity of
the lender's agents and attorneys may violate the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 1692 (1986). A lender may also be subject to having its claim subordinated under the
federal bankruptcy statutes. See 11 U.S.C. S 510(c) (1982).
8. See, e.g., Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Creasy, 301 N.C. 76, -, 269 S.E.2d 117, 123
(1979) (instrument signed by debtor created surety contract with lender which rendered debtor liable
on the instrument).
9. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978). Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that
"[e]very contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement." Id. For a discussion of the U.C.C. good faith standards, see infra notes 12-111 and
accompanying text.
10. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978); 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 670, at
159 (3d ed. 1970) (implied into every contract is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
11. The consequences of the creditor's actions may result in imposition of contract damages for
breach of contract or tort damages for breach of duty. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust, 757
F.2d 752, 764 (6th Cir. 1985) (breach of financing agreement resulted in lender liability for damage
to business which collapsed); Young v. Bank of America, 141 Cal. App. 3d 108, 113, 190 Cal. Rptr.
122, 126 (1983) (creditor liable for tort damages for breach of statutory duty regarding customer's
credit card).
12. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1978).
13. Id. 5 1-203 (1978). Section 1-203 provides that "[e]very contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." Id. The obligation of good
faith cannot be disclaimed by agreement between the parties, but the standards by which the
performance of the obligation are measured may be defined by agreement. Id. § 1-102(2)(b) (1978).




Code applies. 14  Section 1-203, however, does not give an
independent definition of good faith and, therefore, the honesty in
fact standard found in section 1-201(19) is applied. 15 It is possible
for the parties to define the terms by which the good faith standard
will be measured. 16 If the debtor and creditor do define good faith
in their agreement, it is possible to require the creditor to maintain
an objective standard of good faith in the performance of the
contract. '7
The honesty in fact standard contained in section 1-201(19)
has been given a narrow, subjective interpretation by some
courts.' 8 This means that the debtor will not be able to hold the
lender liable for breach of good faith unless he or she can show that
the lender was actually dishonest in the transaction.19
In Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 20 the debtor, a
grain elevator, argued that the lender must have a reasonable belief
that the prospect of payment is impaired before it could accelerate a
debt and declare the loan due and payable. 2' The Iowa Supreme
Court rejected this argument and reasoned that in order for the
lender to be held liable, the elevator had to prove that the lender's
concern with the security of its loans was not genuine.2 2 It did not
14. Id. S 1-203 (1978). For the text of section 1-203, see supra note 13. In Bartlett Bank & Trust Co.
V. McJunkins, the Illinois Court of Appeals noted that the general rule was that the Code did not apply
to real estate transactions, but that there was a strong tendency of courts to apply the Code directly or
by analogy to these transactions. Bartlett Bank & Trust Co. v. McJunkins, 147 Ill. App. 3d 52,
497 N.E.2d 398, 403 (1986).
15. SeeU.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 1-203 (1978).
16. Id. § 1-102(2)(b) (1978); see also Bartlett Bank & Trust Co. v. MeJunkins, 147 Ill. App. 3d
52, -, 497 N.E.2d 398, 403 (1986). In Bartlett Bank the transaction in question was a home
mortgage. Bartlett Bank, 147 Ill. App. 3d at -, 497 N.E.2d at 400. The promissory note was
evidence that the debt contained a provision that the bank could accelerate the maturity of the note
and declare the balance due if the bank reasonably considered itself to be insecure. Id. at _ , 497
N.E.2d at 400-01. Because the parties used the term "reasonably," the court concluded that an
objective standard was to be applied in the determination of good faith. Id. at __ , 497 N.E.2d at
404. The bank was required to have some rational basis for its determination of insecurity other than
the mere subjective belief that there had been some impairment of the prospect of payment or
performance. Id. at __, 497 N.E.2d at 404. The appellate court did not resolve the issue as to
whether the Uniform Commercial Code applied generally to promissory notes because the parties
had explicitly provided in this promissory note that the bank may exercise any of the remedies
available to it under the Code. Id. at __ , 497 N.E.2d at 404.
17. See Bartlett Bank, 147 Il. App. 3d at __ , 497 N.E.2d at 404 (parties to promissory note
expressly included requirement that creditor act reasonably in determining itself insecure).
18. See U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1978); see, e.g., Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236
N.W.2d 674, 678 (Iowa 1975) (bank subjectively concerned with loans met honesty in fact
requirement).
19. See, e.g., Farmers Coop., 236 N.W.2d at 678 (elevator had not produced substantial proof that
bank's concern for its loans was not genuine).
20. 236 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa 1975).
21. Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674, 677-78 (Iowa 1975).
22. Id. at 678. The Iowa Supreme Court in Farmers Coop. reasoned that when more was required
of good faith than honesty in fact, the Code explicitly stated a different standard. Id.; see U.C.C. § 2-
103(1)(b) (1978) (honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the merchant's trade); U.C.C. § 7-404 (1978) (good faith for a bailee who receives and
delivers goods pursuant to a document of title includes observance of reasonable commercial
standards).
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matter whether that belief was reasonable; the lender merely had to
have genuine concerns about the debtor's financial condition." 3
The elevator's financial situation did in fact look poor. 24 The
elevator suffered a loss in the previous fiscal year and had recently
closed down for two business days. 25 Because of this, the debtor was
unable to show that the lender was not genuinely concerned about
the security of its debts, and there was no issue of fact as to the
lender's good faith.
26
The lender in Farmers Cooperative was not liable to the debtor
because the debtor failed to show that the lender was not "honest in
fact.' '27 The narrow definition of good faith pursuant to section 1-
201 has led courts to look elsewhere for a more expansive
interpretation of the concept of good faith under the Code. 28 One
approach that a court may take is to analogize the merchant
standards of good faith under the Uniform Commercial Code to the
borrower-lender context. 29 Another approach is to add objective
criteria to the general standard of good faith under the Code.
30
1. Expansion of the Good Faith Standard
The Uniform Commercial Code applies a more expansive
standard of good faith with regard to merchants.3" The Code
explicitly requires that the actions of a merchant be commercially
reasonable before that merchant may claim his or her activity was
in good faith. 32 Application of the merchant standard to lenders has
not, however, been largely accepted. 33 In Sievert v. First National
23. Farmers Coop., 236 N.W.2d at 678.
24. See id. The debtor in Farmers Coop. owed the lender $272,000 and had more checks
outstanding than funds in its account. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.; see U.C.C. S 1-201(19)(1978).
28. See U.C.C. 5 201 (1978); see, e.g., Black v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 437 So.2d 26, 29-30
(Miss. 1983) (decisions prior to the Code held that reasonableness standard is applicable and the
court adopted this rule).
29. See, e.g., Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Greasy, 44 N.C. App. 289, -. , 260 S.E.2d 782,
784 (1979), rev'd, 301 N.C. 76, -, 269 S.E.2d 117, 121 (1980) (lower court held good faith
required inquiry into circumstances by which a guaranty was signed because lender's standard was
no less than a merchant's, but supreme court held no inquiry was necessary).
30. See, e.g., Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979) (creditor's
actions must be reasonable in light of the facts).
31. See U.C.C. 5 2-103(1)(b) (1978). Section 2-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code requires
the observance of reasonable commercial standards, as defined by the general course of dealing of
merchants in that trade or profession. Id.
32. See id.; see, e.g., Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So.2d 272, 275 (Ala. 1979) (buyer's
subjective claim of dissatisfaction with delivery of potatoes for chipping failed because objective
analysis showed the shipment was not inferior for that purpose).
33. See, e.g., Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Creasy, 44 N.C. App. 289, -, 260 S.E.2d 782,
784 (1979), rev'd, 301 N.C. 76, -, 269 S.E.2d 117, 121 (1980).
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Bank, 34 the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected the application of
the merchant standard to the borrower-lender context. 
35
In Sievert, the lender was found by the jury to have acted in a
commercially unreasonable manner in its dealings with the
debtor. 36 The debtor was one of the owners of a golf course which
had been financed through the lender.3 7 In exchange for a
refinancing loan, the debtor transferred his interest in the golf
course real estate and improvements to a corporation, which then
gave the lender a mortgage on the property and a security interest
in the fixtures. 38 The debtor also pledged his corporate stock to
secure the loan. 39 The bank subsequently became involved in the
debtor's attempt to sell the golf course, contacting two prospective
purchasers.4 0  Neither prospective buyer purchased the golf
course 4 1 After those deals fell through, the golf course was sold at
an auction.
4 2
The debtor i.n Sievert urged the Minnesota Court of Appeals
to equate commercial reasonableness with good faith.4 3 The court
of appeals held, however, that the merchant standard was not
applicable to lenders for two reasons.44 First, the general standard
of good faith in the 1950 draft of the Uniform Commercial Code
required commercially reasonable behavior for all businesses, but
later drafts required only honesty in fact.4 5 Therefore, the court
concluded that the general definition of good faith was limited to
honesty in fact if the lender was not a merchant.4 6
Second, the court of appeals in Sievert held that a bank does not
qualify as a merchant involved in the sale of goods when the
34. 358 N.W.2d 409 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
35. Sievert v. First Nat'l Bank, 358 N.W.2d 409, 414 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
36. Id. at 411. The jury in Sievert found the lender had not acted in a commercially reasonable
manner when it (1) presented the debtor 17 documents to sign on one day, (2) presented the debtor
documents transferring ownership of the golf course real estate from the debtor's individual
ownership to a corporation and (3) failed to develop whatever potential there might have been to sell
the golf course to a potential buyer. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 412.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 413. The first potential purchaser in Sievert, Byron Christopher, did not want the
clubhouse. Id. The second potential purchaser, Duane Sather, was interested in putting a group of
investors together to buy the entire business. Id. The debtor refused Christopher's offer. Id. Sather
never bought the golf course, initially telling Christopher it was because of pressure placed on him by
the bank. Id. Sather later stated it was not because of any act on the part of the bank, but rather
because of lack of public interest. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 414.
44. Id.
45. Sievert, 358 N.W.2d at 414. Compare U.C.C. 5 1-201(18) (1950) (good faith requires the
"observance by a person of the reasonable commercial standards of any business or trade in which he
is engaged") with U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1978) (good faith requires "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned").
46. Sievert, 358 N.W.2d at 414.
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transaction involves the financing of the debtor or the effort to sell
the debtor's property. 47 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
standard to be applied is only that of honesty in fact. 48
As Sievert indicates, the application of the commercially
reasonable standard to banks has not been generally accepted. 49
Nevertheless, it is possible for a lender to lack the requisite good
faith in the transaction without resort to the commercially
reasonable standard applied to merchants. 50 In Van Bibber v.
Norris,5 1 a bank accelerated the debtor's loan and repossessed the
collateral. 52 The bank raised several arguments upon which to base
its actions, but the Indiana Court of Appeals determined that
weighing evidence was the trial court's function and upheld the
trial court's conclusion that the bank failed to prove that its actions
met the "honesty in fact" standard of good faith required by the
Uniform Commercial Code.
5 3
In Van Bibber the debtor purchased a mobile home from Van
Bibber, a mobile home dealer, who subsequently assigned the
installment agreement signed by the debtor to the American
Fletcher National Bank.5 4 The debtor was often late with his
payments on the mobile home. 55 Additionally, a restraining order
had been issued to prevent the debtor from moving the mobile
home from where it was located because the debtor failed to pay lot
rent. 56 It was not, however, until after the debtor was arrested on a
drug charge and incarcerated that the bank decided to repossess the
mobile home.
57
The installment contract contained provisions indicating when
the seller could accelerate the debt and repossess the mobile
home. 58 The contract allowed the creditor to accelerate upon
default of payment or performance by the debtor; upon loss, theft,
encumbrance or seizure of or levy upon the collateral; or upon the
47. Id.; see U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1978) (merchant is one who deals in goods of the kind); U.C.C. S
2-105(1) (goods are those items which are movable at the time of the identification to the contraction,
excluding the money on which the price is to be paid).
48. Sievert, 358 N.W.2d at 414.
49. Id.; see also Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Creasy, 301 N.C. 76, -, 269 S.E.2d 117, 121
(1980) (circumstances surrounding receipt of surety contract did not require lender to inquire in
order to act in good faith).
50. See, e.g., Van Bibber v. Norris, 404 N.E.2d 1365, 1378 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (debtor
established that lender lacked honesty in fact good faith because lender did not have sufficient facts to
justify determination that prospect of payment or performance was impaired).
51. 404 N.E.2d at 1365 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
52. Van Bibber v. Norris, 404 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
53. Id. at 1378-79; see U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978). For the text of section 1-203, see supra note 9.
54. Van Bibber, 404 N.E.2d at 1369.
55. Id. at 1370.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1371.
58. Id. at 1369.
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creditor deeming itself insecure. 59 The creditor in Van Bibber argued
that these three provisions in the security agreement justified the
repossession of the collateral and thus the creditor was acting in
good faith when it repossessed the mobile home. 60
The Indiana Court of Appeals looked to whether the creditor's
actions were made in good faith. 61 The court approached the issue
of good faith by inquiring whether the creditor in fact relied on the
claimed violations as the grounds for its acceleration and
repossession. 62 The court stated that "[c]ertainly it does not
overtax the notion of good faith to conclude that a decision to
accelerate and repossess... can be upheld only if the decision was in
fact made for that reason." ' 63 The court reasoned that absent
reliance on facts known to the creditor at the time it decides to
exercise its option to accelerate and repossess, the creditor's
decision would "[fall] short of the 'general requirement of
fundamental integrity in commercial transactions regulated by the
Code"' and -could not be justified as being in good faith. 64 The
creditor tried to base its claim of good faith on circumstances which
came to its attention after the creditor had already made the
decision to accelerate the debt, but the court would not allow the
creditor to create good faith retroactively. 65
First, the bank in Van Bibber argued that a missed installment
constituted default. 66 The Indiana Court of Appeals pointed out
that this argument was undercut by the fact that on the same day
the bank requested repossession of the home, an official of the bank
stated to another party that the account of the debtor was current. 67
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1372.
61. Id. at 1373, 1375-76. The application of the test of good faith to the default provisions in the
installment contract has been questioned by some courts. See, e.g., Bowen v. Danna, 276 Ark. 528,
is 637 S.W.2d 560, 564 (1982) (creditor's actions tested regarding good faith only if acceleration
is based on creditor's deeming himself or herself insecure and not if default is based on provision
entirely within debtor's control). But see Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1378-79 (9th
Cir. 1979) (acceleration nonetheless involves creditor's decision to act and that must be in good
faith).
Other courts have stated that there is no requirement of good faith in the decision to require
immediate payment of the loan if the instrument involved is a demand note. See, e.g., Fulton Nat'l
Bank v. Willis-Denny Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, __ , 269 S.E.2d 916, 919 (1980) (demand note
by its very nature allows creditor to demand payment of the debt at any time or for any reason); see
also R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 1-208:7 (3d ed. 1981) (U.C.C. § 1-208 does not
apply to demand obligations).
62. Van Bibber, 404 N.E.2d at 1373, 1375-76.
63. Id. at 1373.
64. Id. (quoting Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1964)); see
U.C.C. 5 1-203 (1978) (every contract imposes an obligation of good faith); U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978)
(principles of law and equity shall supplement the provisions of the Code).
65. Van Bibber, 404 N.E.2d at 1376.
66. Id. at 1372. The security agreement in Van Bibber provided for acceleration of the debt upon
default of"payment or performance." Id. at 1369.
67. Id. at 1372. In Van Bibber, although the debtor was often late with his payment, a bank
official indicated that a ten-day grace period was generally given before the payment was deemed in
default. Id. at 1370.
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The bank then argued that the restraining order regarding the
mobile home constituted an impoundment of the mobile home,
and, therefore, default on the part of the debtor. 68 The court,
however, disagreed with the bank stating that the purpose of the
restraining order was to maintain the status quo and, therefore,
could not be considered a default.
69
Finally, the bank claimed that the acceleration and
repossession were justified under the insecurity clause in the
agreement. 70 The bank argued that both payment and performance
were impaired by the fact that the debtor was in jail. 71 The court
stated that although the incarceration of the debtor may be grounds
for insecurity, it did not ipso facto justify the claim. 72 According to
the court of appeals, the justifications raised by the lender in regard
to the incarceration, such as the debtor's defense costs and the fact
that he had to pawn some items to raise bail, all occurred after the
decision to repossess had been made. 73 The court was therefore not
willing to accept these justifications.
74
Although the Indiana Court of Appeals in Van Bibber made an
inquiry into the honesty in fact of the creditor, the approach taken
by the court added objective considerations to the analysis.
75
According to the analysis of the Indiana Court of Appeals, the
question was, therefore, not only what the bank knew and whether
it knew those facts when it acted, but also whether those facts
justified its actions.7 6 The creditor's actions were tested by a
reasonableness standard. The creditor failed to show that a
68. Id. at 1374. The security agreement in Van Bibber allowed for acceleration upon "loss, theft,
substantial damage, destruction, sale or encumbrance to or of any of the Goods, or the making of any
levy, seizure or attachment thereof or thereon." Id. at 1369.
69. Id. at 1374.
70. Id. at 1375. The security agreement in Van Bibber stated that "the Seller, for any reason
deeming itself insecure,.. .may at its option without notice or demand declare all of the Buyer's
obligations to be immediately due and payable." Id. at 1369.
71. Id. at 1374-78.
72. Id. at 1377.
73. Id. at 1376.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 1379. In Van Bibber the Indiana Court of Appeals' inquiry into the creditor's
subjective honesty in fact centered on the statement made by the bank official that the debtor's
account was current. Id. at 1376. The fact that the bank accelerated and repossessed despite this
statement indicated to the court that there was a lack of subjective honesty on the part of the bank.
Id.
In regard to the objective elements of the standard, the bank appealed a conclusioh of law made
by the trial court which stated that the bank did not act as a reasonable person would act. Id. at 1379.
The bank did not argue against the use of objective criteria, but it argued that the trial court
overemphasized that criteria. Id. The court of appeals rejected the argument that too much emphasis
was placed on the objective elements of the inquiry. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted
the standard set out in Universal CI. T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, which combined both objective and
subjective elements in the test of good faith. Id.; see Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 164
Ind. App. 516, __, 329 N.E.2d 620, 624 (1975). In Universal the good faith standard was
articulated as honesty in fact plus an inquiry as to whether the determination of the insecurity would
have been made by a reasonable person under the same set of circumstances. Universal, 164 Ind.
App. at __, 329 N.E.2d at 624.
76. Van Bibber, 404 N.E.2d at 1373.
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reasonable person determining the insecurity of his or her loans
would have accelerated the debt based on the knowledge the
creditor had at the time. 77 In this regard, the standard of good faith
was expanded beyond the wholly subjective test applied by some
courts.
78
The good faith "honesty in fact" standard of section 1- 203 of
the Uniform Commercial Code has been interpreted as simply
directive, and not remedial in and of itself.79 Although section 1-
203 requires good faith in the transaction, it only constitutes a
general definition of good faith applicable to the Code and does not
provide a separate cause of action, and, thus, the debtor must look
for another section of the Code upon which to base its suit. 80 This
would hot be necessary, however, if the Code section involved
contained a separate requirement of good faith. 81 Section 1-208
contains just such a provision.
82
2. Good Faith Under Section 1-208 of the Uniform Commercial
Code
A good faith standard is incorporated into the contract
pursuant to section 1-208 if the contract in question contains a
provision that allows the creditor to deem itself insecure and
accelerate the debt "at will." ' 83 The lender may only accelerate a
debt if he or she "in good faith believes that the prospect of
payment or performance is impaired." '8 4 Although section 1-208
77. Id. at 1379.
78. See id.; see, e.g., Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Iowa
1975) (test of good faith under the Code is wholly subjective). For a discussion of Farmers Coop., see
supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
79. Washburn v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 151 Il. App. 3d 21, -, 502 N.E.2d 739,
743 (1986) (section 1-203 is directive rather than remedial and implemented by provisions such as the
"commercially reasonable" sections); see U.C.C. S 1-203 (1978).
80. See U.C.C. S 1-203 (1978). For the text of section 1-203, see supra note 9; see also Washburn
v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 151 Ill. App. 3d 21, __, 502 N.E.2d 739, 743 (1986). The court
in Washburn indicated that in order to initiate a cause of action, the debtor must look for another
section of the Code which implements that standard of good faith. Id. at -, 502 N.E.2d at 743. In
Washburn, the primary issue centered on disposal of collateral under section 9-507(2). Id. at __ , 502
N.E.2d at 742; see U.C.C. S 9-507(2) (1978) (disposition of collateral, must be made in a
commercially reasonable manner). Good faith was implemented in section 9-507(2) by a provision
requiring commercially reasonable activity. See U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (1978). The court in Washburn
failed to find that the disposal of the collateral was commercially unreasonable, and, therefore, the
debtor had no claim for relief for breach of the Code's obligation of good faith. Washburn, 151 Il1.
App. 3d at __ , 502 N.E.2d at 743; cf. Consolidated Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. C-1 v. Farmers
Bank, 686 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (although no duty is imposed by section 3-405, a
bank is still under a general obligation to act in good faith).
81. For a discussion of S 1-208 which contains a separate good faith requirement, see inJra notes
83-111 and accompanying text.
82. U.C.C. S1-208 (1978). For the text of 1-208, see infra note 83.
83. Id. Section 1-208 provides that "a term providing that one party...may accelerate payment
or performance or require collateral or additional collateral 'at will' or 'when he deems himself
insecure' or in words of similar import shall be construed to mean that he shall have power to do so
only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired." Id. The
burden of showing that the creditor's actions were not in good faith is on the debtor. Id.
84. Id.
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applies to contracts in which the creditor may "deem himself
insecure" and accelerate "at will," it is less certain whether 1-208
will apply to a default provision that does not contain an insecurity
clause. 85  Some courts do not apply section 1-208 beyond
instruments containing "at-will" default provisions because, since
the creditor cannot deem the debt insecure, the event of default is
exclusively within the debtor's control and, therefore, there is no
need to require good faith on the part of the creditor.
86
The good faith obligation of section 1-208 was applied to notes
containing default clauses as well as notes with insecurity clauses in
a case arising under Texas law. 87 In Brown v. Avemco Investment
Corp.88 the debtor gave a mortgage to the creditor, Avemco, in
exchange for the purchase price of an airplane. 89 The security
agreement provided that the loan would be in default if the secured
party sold, leased, or mortgaged the collateral.90 Subsequently, the
debtor entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs, third parties to
the transaction, to lease the plane and contribute toward the
payment of the mortgage with an option to purchase the plane after
the mortgage was paid. 91  Avemco was notified of this
arrangement. 92 Two years later, when the plaintiffs exercised the
option to purchase the plane, Avemco declared the loan in default,
accelerated the debt, and repossessed the plane.
93
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals characterized the
acceleration clause as designed to protect the creditor from actions
of the debtor that would endanger the creditor's security. 94 The
court stated, however, that the clauses were not to be used
85. See Bowen v. Danna, 276 Ark. 528, -, 637 S.W.2d 560, 564 (1982) (section 1-208 does
not apply when the right to accelerate is conditioned on an event entirely within debtor's control); see
also U.C.C. § 1-208 (1978) (good faith belief in impairment of payment or performance required if
terms of the agreement allow creditor to accelerate "at will" or "when he deems himself insecure").
Default clauses are those which allow acceleration and repossession of the collateral upon the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of some specified event or events. See Van Bibber v. Norris, 404 N.E.2d
1365, 1369 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). For a discussion of the good faith requirement for default security
clauses, see supra note 61 and accompanying text. A typical default provision would require the
debtor to keep the collateral insured against damage or destruction. See, e.g., Bowen, 276 Ark. at
__ 637 S.W.2d at 562 (failure to keep collateral insured was default of specific provision of
promissory note).
86. See Bowen, 276 Ark. at -, 637 S.W.2d at 562. The acceleration clause in Bowen provided
that the decision to accelerate after default was "at the option of the holder." Id. at __ , 637
S.W.2d at 565 (Purtle, J., dissenting). The majority opinion, however, focused on the fact that the
debt accelerates only upon default of the debtor, and held that section 1-208 did not apply. Id. at
-, 637 S.W.2d at 564; see U.C.C. § 1-208 (1978). For the text of 5 1-208, see supra note 83.
87. See Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1379 (9th Cir. 1979).
88. 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979).
89. Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1979).




94. Id. at 1376. The security agreement in Brown provided for acceleration of the debt if the
property covered by the agreement was "sold, leased, transferred, mortgaged, or otherwise
encumbered" without the written consent of the lender. Id. at 1369.
offensively by the creditor, simply for its commercial advantage. 95
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the courts of equity
in Texas have always been careful to evaluate the fairness of
acceleration in light of the particular facts of each case. 96 The court
reasoned that the test of good faith in acceleration under the Code
was analogous to the older equitable tests of reasonableness. 97
Thus, the court had no difficulty applying the reasonableness test to
at-will acceleration clauses, which are clearly subject to section 1-
208 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 98 The court then took the
analogy a step further and applied the reasonableness test to default
clauses. 99
According to the court in Brown, acceleration of the debt was
not automatic upon the debtor's failure to comply with terms of the
default clause. 100 The creditor still must make the decision to
exercise the option to accelerate.10 1 The court reasoned that the
existence of this discretion made the potential for abuse of a default
provision exercisable at the option of the creditor just as substantial
as that of an insecurity clause. 102 Therefore, the court held that
section 1-208 applied to default-type clauses, and that the creditor's
decision to accelerate the loan must be made in good faith. 10 3
Because the trial court refused to give the jury instructions on the
issue of good faith, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.10 4
The court in Brown applied section 1-208 to the default clause
because it believed the potential for abuse of a default acceleration
clause was just as substantial as with an at-will acceleration
95. Id. at 1376. The court in Brown stated that the default acceleration clause could be used to
take advantage of the technical default on the part of the debtor, allowing the creditor to claim the
entire debt was payable immediately. Id. at 1379. The creditor gained an advantage from the
technical default because it could disregard the long term payment arrangement and get its money
back sooner, with all the interest accrued as if the debt had been paid off over a longer period of time.
Id.
96. Id. at 1376; see, e.g., Bischoffv. Rearick, 232 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (no
acceleration allowed when facts made it unjust or oppressive); Parker v. Mazure, 13 S.W.2d 174,
175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (acceleration clause not enforced because of creditor's fraud and
inequitable conduct).
97. Brown, 603 F.2d at 1376. The court in Brown indicated that accelerations have been required
to be reasonable in light of the facts at the time and not oppressive or unjust, and they have not been
allowed when the debtor's default was due to mistake, accident, or the creditor's own misconduct.
Id. For the cases the court relied upon, see supra note 96.
98. Id.; see U.C.C. 5 1-208. For the text of section 1-208, see supra note 83.




102. Id. at 1379. The court in Brown stated that the option to accelerate upon default by the
creditor could potentially be used as a "sword for commercial gain rather than as a shield against
security impairment." Id.
103. Id.; see U.C.C. S 1-208 (1978). But see Bowen v. Danna, 276 Ark. 528, -, 637 S.W.2d
560, 562-64 (1982) (section 1-208 does not apply to default clauses despite language which indicates
the decision is at the option of the creditor). For a discussion of default versus insecurity clauses, see
supra notes 61 and 85.
104. Brown, 603 F.2d at 1380.
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clause. 105 Despite the fact that section 1-208 addresses itself to only
at-will acceleration clauses, the application of the good faith
standard to other types of default provisions is not ultimately
inconsistent with the Code because section 1-203 provides an
overall requirement of good faith. 106 Thus, the court's conclusion
in Brown that section 1-208 requires the decision to accelerate
default clauses be made in good faith, does not conflict with section
1-203's general requirement of good faith.'0 7 A debtor may still
argue that the creditor did not exercise its options under the default
clause in the good faith required by section 1-203, and that the test
of good faith is the reasonableness standard used in Brown. 0 8 The
debtor, however, will have to look for other provisions of the Code
to base its cause of action on because, as previously discussed,
section 1-203 is not a remedial statute. 
1 09
In interpreting the standard of good faith applicable when the
creditor exercises its option to accelerate the debt, courts have
added a "reasonableness" requirement to good faith under section
1-208, in an attempt to expand the good faith standard of honesty
in fact defined under section 1-201(19).110 If the debtor fails to
establish that the creditor breached the standard of good faith
required by the Code under section 1-201, whether interpreted
subjectively or objectively, it is possible for the debtor to look for
remedies on the contract that are not based on the Code itself, but
rather on principles of equity."' The next section will address those
equitable principles.
105. Id. at 1379.
106. See U.C.C. S 1-203 (1978). For the text of section 1-203, see supra note 9.
107. Compare U.C.C. § 1-208 (1978) (good faith required to accelerate at will) with U.C.C. I-
203 (1978) (good faith required in each transaction). For the text of section 1-203, see supra note 9.
For the text of 1-208, see supra note 83. The court in Brown noted that section 1-208 was added to the
Uniform Commercial Code because the drafters recognized the potential for abuse that acceleration
at will contained and, therefore, warranted a specific pronouncement of the need for good faith.
Brown, 603 F.2d at 1378-79 (1979). This, the court indicated, does not mean that default clauses in
general do not present a danger that requires the inclusion of a good faith standard. Id. at 1379.
108. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978); Brown, 603 F.2d at 1376.
109. See Washburn v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 151 Ill. App. 3d 21, -, 502 N.E.2d
739, 743 (1986) (section 1-203 is directive rather than remedial); U.C.C. S 1-203 (1978). For a
discussion of the directive nature of section 1-203, see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
110. See U.C.C. § 1-208 (1978) ("at will" acceleration must be in good faith); id. § 1-201(19)
(good faith is defined as honesty in fact in the transaction). In Smith v. Union Bank, the Indiana Court
of Appeals stated that the Uniform Commercial Code required that the determination of insecurity
required at least honesty in fact, and that the determination of insecurity must have been objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. Smith v. Union Bank, 452 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983). The debtor in Smith failed to show that the lender had made anything but a reasonable
business decision, based on the fact that the lender had knowledge of the debtor's poor financial
condition. Id.; see also Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 164 Ind. App. 516, - , 329
N.E.2d 620, 624 (1975) (determination of insecurity tested by whether a reasonable man would have
made a similar decision); Black v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 437 So.2d 26, 29-30 (Miss. 1983)
(circumstances must furnish probable cause for belief that loan security was unsafe when viewed by
reasonable man). For further discussion of the inclusion of a reasonableness standard, see supra notes
50-78 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1379 (9th Cir. 1979) (equity
required new trial for debtor even if 5 1-208 does not apply to factual situation).
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B. CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES OUTSIDE THE CODE
The Uniform Commercial Code is not dispositive on the issue
of contractual remedies for good faith violations by creditors. 1 2
Although the creditor's actions may meet the standards of good
faith imposed by the Code, the debtor may attempt to prevent the




The debtor may attempt to argue that the court should
exercise its powers of equity to prevent harsh results to the debtor
upon the creditor's enforcement of the terms of the agreement
between the parties. 11 4 This equity defense was raised by the debtor
in Bowen v. Danna. 115 In Bowen, the debtor failed to convince the
Arkansas Supreme Court that the acceleration of a promissory note
with a default acceleration clause required the creditor to act with
the good faith required by section 1-208 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.11 6 The debtor then contended that the court
should nonetheless refuse the creditor the right to accelerate on the
grounds that she had substantially complied with the terms of the
contract. 117
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court in Bowen ultimately
rejected the debtor's claim of an equitable defense, the court stated
that "[c]learly a court of equity can relieve a debtor from the
hardship of acceleration of maturity." 1 1 8 The court indicated that a
default type of acceleration can be prevented on the grounds of
112. See U.C.C. S 1-103 (1978) (principles of law and equity shall supplement the Code).
113. For a discussion of the equitable defenses, see infa notes 114-53 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Brown, 603 F.2d at 1379 (equity requires that creditor not use acceleration clause
as a sword against the debtor out of inequitable desire to take unfair advantage of debtor).
115. 276 Ark. 258, 637 S.W.2d 560 (1982).
1 16. Bowen v. Danna, 276 Ark. 258, - , 637 S.W.2d 560, 564 (1982); see U.C.C. § 1-208
(1978). For the text of section 1-208, see supra note 83. For a discussion of the application of the good
faith standard to default acceleration clauses, see supra notes 61 and 85.
117. Bowen, 276 Ark. at-, 637 S.W.2d at 564. In Bowen, a promissory note was signed by the
debtor as part of the transaction to purchase a home owned by the creditors. Id. at -, 637 S.W.2d
at 561. The debtor was consistently late in making her payments but the creditors continued to
accept them anyway. Id. at __ , 637 S.W.2d at 562. The debtor failed to pay the real estate taxes,
resulting in a tax sale by the state and redemption of the house by the debtor. Id. at -, 637
S.W.2d at 562. Additionally, the debtor failed to keep the house insured as required by the
promissory note. Id. at __ , 637 S.W.2d at 562. The debtor claimed she substantially complied with
the requirement that she insure the home. Id. at-, 637 S.W.2d at 564. She attempted to offer the
creditors a post-dated check eighteen days after they had themselves paid the premium to have the
insurance reinstated. Id. at __, 637 S.W.2d at 562. The creditors refused to accept the check. Id. at
__ 637 S.W.2d at 562. The debtor also obtained a separate policy on the house more than four
months after the original policy was reinstated. Id. at __ , 637 S.W.2d at 564.
118. Id. at-_, 637 S.W.2d at 564.
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accident, mistake, fraud or inequitable conduct on the part of the
creditor. 1 9 The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, upheld the
lower court's finding that the debtor had failed to prove that any of
these defenses were present in this case. 20 Therefore, the Arkansas
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's conclusion that because
the debtor failed to establish any of the required defenses, equity
did not prevent the creditors from accelerating the debt according
to the promissory note. 1
21
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brown v.
Avemco Investment Corp. 122 stated that equity required that the debtor
receive a new trial to determine if the creditor's acceleration was
proper. 23 The court noted two reasons for allowing equity to
prevent the creditor from accelerating the debt. 24 First, the
acceleration of a debt often works as a forfeiture of the debtor's
right to pay the debt over time. 25 Second, creditors use technical
defaults of the contract as an excuse for maturing the contract and
forcing the debtor to pay the entire debt or forfeit its property. 1
26
In Brown it was not clear whether the creditor had accelerated
the debt from a reasonable fear of the impairment of the security or
from an inequitable desire to take advantage of a technical default
on the part of the debtor. 27 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
granted the debtor a new trial and indicated that it would have
granted the new trial whether or not it found a violation of the good
faith required under section 1-208 of the Uniform Commercial
119. Id. at__ , 637 S.W.2d at 564.
120. Id. at__, 637 S.W.2d at 564.
121. Id. at-, 637 S.W.2d at 564. The dissent in Bowen stated that there was no showing that
the debtor was in default, because the property was redeemed after the tax sale and the house was
insured. Id. at -, 637 S.W.2d at 565 (Purtle, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the
foreclosure was undertaken solely for the purpose of causing the debtor to forfeit the considerable
amount of money she had already paid. Id. at __ , 637 S.W.2d at 566. The dissent, therefore,
concluded that this result was unconscionable and inequitable, and should have been prevented by
the court as a matter of equity. Id. at -, 637 S.W.2d at 566.
122. 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979).
123. Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1379 (9th Cir. 1979).
124. Id.
125. Id. The court in Brown cited Bischoff v. Rearick, which indicated that acceleration of the
debt deprived the debtor of its right to pay over time and forced the debtor to pay off the debt all at
once. Id. at 1379 (citing Bischoff v. Rearick, 232 S.W.2d 174, 176 (1950)); see also Bowen v. Danna,
276 Ark. 528, __, 637 S.W.2d 560, 565 (1982) (Purtle, J., dissenting) (forfeiture of the
considerable amount of money already invested in the security).
126. Brown, 603 F.2d at 1379. See, e.g., Bowen, 276 Ark. at __, 637 S.W.2d at 565 (although
lender routinely accepted late payments, debtor lost $36,000 down payment plus additional monthly
payments when creditor repossessed collateral because debtor was late with payments).
127. Brown, 603 F.2d at 1379. The court in Brown stated that although the acceleration of the
debt was based on a lease executed over two years ago, there was an indication that the creditor's
actions were less clearly defensive than they were potentially motivated by inequitable
considerations. Id. A proper defensive grounds for acceleration of the debt would have existed if the
prospect of payment had been impaired, and this technical default did not indicate that the prospect
of payment was impaired. Id. at 1380.
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Code because the lower court failed to consider the debtor's rights"
to equitable relief. 
1 2 8
In summary, if the debtor is able to establish the basic grounds
for equitable relief, namely mistake, accident, fraud or inequitable
conduct on the part of the creditor, the debtor may be able to
prevent the creditor from accelerating the debt. 
129
2. Estoppel
The theory of estoppel has also been used by debtors in an
attempt to prevent creditors from accelerating the debt.1 30 Section
1-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code allows for the introduction
of course of dealing between the parties to aid in interpretation of
the meaning they attach to the terms of their agreement. 131 The
debtor may argue that the creditor is estopped from claiming that
the debtor is in default of the contract terms because the established
course of dealing between the parties indicates that the creditor did
not intend to enforce the terms of the contract. 132
The debtor in Pierce v. Leasing International, Inc., 133 contended
that by accepting late payments several times over a ten-month
period, the creditor had established a course of dealing that
prevented it from enforcing the exact terms of the security
agreement without notice and demand for payment. 134 The
Georgia Court of Appeals agreed that the creditor's actions raised a
question of fact in regard to estoppel based on course of dealing.1 35
The court stated that if the creditor had given the debtor the
reasonable impression that late payments would be accepted or that
the arrearage need not be immediately paid, a course of dealing
was established, and the creditor may be estopped from
128. Id. at 1379; see U.C.C. § 1-208 (1978). For the text of S 1-208, see supra note 83.
129. See, e.g., Bowen, 276 Ark. at __ , 637 S.W.2d at 564 (debtor may be relieved from
hardship of acceleration if mistake, accident, fraud or other inequitable misconduct is shown).
130. See, e.g., Central Bank v. Eystad, 710 P.2d 710, 714 (Mont. 1985) (debtor claimed creditor
could not foreclose because estopped by years of previous renewals of the loans).
131. U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (1978). Section 1-205(1) provides that "a course of dealing is a sequence
of previous conduct between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct."
Id.
132. See, e.g., Central Bank, 710 P.2d at 713 (debtor argued that practice and course of conduct
over years by extending and renewing debtor's loans without demanding payment on the principal
indicated no intention to enforce contract terms as written).
133. 142 Ga. App. 371, 235 S.E.2d 752 (1977).
134. Pierce v. Leasing Int'l Inc., 142 Ga. App. 371, - , 235 S.E.2d 752, 754 (1977). The
creditor in Pierce claimed that the debtor was in default of an automobile lease agreement because the
debtor had missed a number of the required monthly payments. Id. at -, 235 S.E.2d at 753-54.
The debtor had missed payments before, however, and the creditor had accepted the late payments
without making a demand for timely payment. Id. at __, 235 S.E.2d at 754.
135. Id. at -_, 235 S.E.2d at 754.
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accelerating the debt until notice and demand for payment is given
to the debtor. 1
36
The court in Pierce concluded that the debtor was entitled to
notice or demand for payment before the creditor could accelerate
the debt. 137 The court recognized that public policy did not allow
the creditor to take action which was unconscionable in light of the
interpretation of the contract evidenced by the creditor's own
actions. 138 Accelerating the debt because of the late payments
would be unconscionable if the creditor led the debtor to believe
that payments would be accepted. 1
39
The debtor had less success in raising an estoppel claim in
Central Bank v. Eystad. 140 Central Bank had renewed the Eystads'
notes a number of times over the years, but after one of the renewed
notes came due and was not paid, the bank foreclosed on the
note. 11 The debtors claimed that the bank should be estopped from
foreclosing on the note because the parties had engaged in a course
of conduct for several years that had caused the debtors to rely, to
their detriment, on the renewal of the notes when they came due. 1
42
The Montana Supreme Court rejected this argument and
agreed with the lower court's finding that the bank had no duty to
renew or extend the loans for an indefinite time. 143 The Montana
Supreme Court indicated that it was not going to impose a
condition upon the bank that it continue to give concessions to
these debtors, as long as the bank made its decision to foreclose in
good faith and for a justified business reason. 144 The court
136. Id. at - , 235 S.E.2d at 754; see also Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 292
(Alaska 1983) (course of dealing in negotiating a renewal of loan estopped creditor from foreclosing).
The court in Pierce indicated that although, as a general rule, the creditor had no duty to give notice
to the debtor before repossessing the collateral, the creditor may impose such a rule upon himself by
a pattern or course of conduct. Pierce, 142 Ga. App. at __ , 235 S.E.2d at 754. The court found that
such a result was justified on policy grounds as well as estoppel principles. Id. at __ , 235 S.E.2d at
754.
137. Pierce, 142 Ga. App. at _ , 235 S.E.2d at 754.
138. Id. at..., 235 S.E.2d at 754.
139. Id. at __, 235 S.E.2d at 754. The court of appeals in Pierce ruled that there remained a
question of fact regarding whether the creditor had given the debtor a reasonable impression that late
payments would be accepted, thereby requiring the creditor to give notice and demand for payment
prior to repossession, and thus, the court-remanded the case to the trial court. Id. at __, 235 S.E.2d
at 754-55.
140. 710 P.2d 710 (Mont. 1985).
141. Central Bank v. Eystad, 710 P.2d 710, 712 (Mont. 1985).
142. Id. The lender in Central Bank had made several operating loans to the debtor and had
renewed the notes for these loans when it gave the debtor additional advances on the loans. Id. at
711. The lender had renewed the note at issue in the case twice before. Id. at 711-12.
143. Id. at 713. In Central Bank, the lower court held that the Eystads were bound by the terms of
their promissory note, despite the fact that the bank had renewed loans for these customers in the
past. Id.
144. Id. The decision by the Montana Supreme Court in Central Bank reflects the reluctance of
courts to require a bank to continue to loan money to borrowers who appear to be less than secure
financially. See id.; accord Stenberg v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 307 Minn. 487, 488, 238 N.W.2d
218, 219 (1976) (bank is presumed to not commit itself to making bad loans).
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determined that the bank had acted in good faith and with
justifiable business judgment. 145  Accordingly, the Montana
Supreme Court concluded that the bank was not estopped from
foreclosing on the overdue note. 
146
The debtor in Central Bank failed to convince the court that the
creditor should be estopped from foreclosing on the promissory
note because of a prior course of dealing with the debtor. 14 7 The
debtor in Pierce v. Leasing International, Inc., 148 however, was
successful in arguing that the lender should be estopped because of
the course of dealing between the parties. 149 The difference between
the findings of these two cases can be explained by the nature of the
actions of the banks. In Pierce, the bank repossessed the security
without giving any notice to the debtor that the late payments
would no longer be accepted. 150 In Central Bank, the bank and the
debtors had discussed the fact that the bank would not be renewing
the notes unless the debtors reduced the total amount of money
owed to the bank by a substantial amount. 15 1 In essence, the
debtors in Central Bank could not justifiably rely on the renewal of
the loans, whereas the debtor in Pierce could rely on the opportunity
to make late payments. 1
52
Because there are public policy concerns regarding the bank's financial health, a debtor will find
it difficult to convince a court that the bank should have to continue loaning money indefinitely,
without showing some breach of commitment or lack of good faith on the part of the bank. See, e.g.,
Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944, 954 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (debtor
established that creditor had made commitment to lend money and, therefore, failure to make the
loan was an actionable breach). The debtor in Central Bank was unable to establish that the bank had
made a firm commitment to renew the loan, and, accordingly, the debtor's claim failed. Central Bank,
710 P.2d at 713.
145. Central Bank, 710 P.2d at 713. The Montana Supreme Court in Central Bank found that the
bank was legitimately concerned with the status of the loan and that it had attempted to
communicate that concern to the debtor prior to the refusal to renew the note. Id.
In support of its claim of a legitimate business judgment, the bank introduced into evidence
comment sheets kept by its officer which indicated the history and circumstances of the loans. Id. at
712. These sheets indicated that the bank had informed the debtor that the loan would not be re-
newed unless the debtor made a substantial reduction of the outstanding balance of the loans. Id. The
debtor was informed of this decision two months before the suit to foreclose the note was commenced.
Id. An officer of the bank testified that the bank had delayed taking action on the note when it was
due in order to allow the debtor time to find new financing and to pay the bank what it was owed. Id.
Moreover, it appeared that the bank may have been unsecured as to part of the loans, because of
future advances made on the mortgage. Id. at 711. These facts added up to the conclusion that the
bank had acted in good faith and with justifiable business judgment. Id. at 713.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 712-13.
148. Pierce v. Leasing Int'l, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 371, 235 S.E.2d 752 (1977). For a discussion of
Pierce, see supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
149. Id. at 235 S.E.2d at 754.
150. Id. at_., 235 S.E.2d at 753.
151. Central Bank, 710 P.2d at 712. The debtors in Central Bank failed to make a reduction of the
outstanding loan balance despite the bank's request that they do so. Id. The Bank's officers also
testilied they had delayed foreclosing on the notes for a short time so that the debtors would have
time to find other financing. Id.
152. Compare Central Bank, 710 P.2d at 712-13 (bank not estopped from foreclosing despite
debtors' claim of detrimental reliance on lender's prior renewals of loan) with Pierce, 142 Ga. App. at
-, 235 S.E.2d at 754 (bank estopped from repossessing without notice when debtor relied on
history of nonenforcement of security agreement's due date for payments).
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To be a successful weapon against foreclosure, the estoppel
defense appears to require lack of notice to the debtor that the bank
will be taking action on the debt. 153 The lack of notice aspect also
plays a role in the area of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. This Note will address the theory of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the next section. 5 4
III. THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND
FAIR DEALING
The theory of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing has emerged as a potentially effective weapon brandished
by debtors against overstepping creditors. The implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing arises in two contexts in lender-borrower
cases. First, breach of the covenant itself has been used as the
grounds for suit. 155 Second, there is emerging case law in which the
breach of the covenant forms the basis for a suit in tort. 156 Not all
courts concede, however, that the covenant applies to all
contracts. 157 The concept bears a closer look.
A. BREACH OF THE COVENANT AS GROUNDS FOR RECOVERY
Although not universally accepted, it has been stated that
there is implied into every contract a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 158 This covenant requires that no party do anything that
will injure the right of the other party to receive the benefits of the
agreement. 59 The implied covenant is not the subjective Uniform
Commercial Code definition of good faith, but rather is a more
amorphous concept, having its roots in the common law and in the
expansive interpretation of good faith given in some Code cases. 160
153. See Pierce, 142 Ga. App. at-_, 235 S.E.2d at 754.
154. See infra notes 155-254 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., East Lansing State Bank v. Red Cedar Constr. Co. (In re Red Cedar Constr. Co.),
63 Bankr. 228, 235 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (debtor sued lender for breach of duty to deal with debtor in
good faith). For a discussion of actions for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, see infra notes 159-204 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, -, 726 P.2d 565, 576 (1986) (tort action
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing recognized). For a discussion of tort
actions for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see infra notes 205-53 and
accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Central Bank v. Eystad, 710 P.2d 710, 714 (Mont. 1985) (court does not concede
that covenant of good faith and fair dealing was imposed upon lender).
158. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949) (every
contract contains the implied obligation to deal fairly and in good faith); Shaw v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co., 126 Vt. 206, -, 226 A.2d 903, 906 (1967) (same); 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 10,
§ 670 at 159 (same). But cf. Central Bank, 710 P.2d at 714 (court does not concede covenant of good
faith and fair dealing was imposed on lender).
159. For a discussion of cases involving the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing see
infra notes 161-245.
160. See U.C.C. 5 1-201(19) (1978) (good faith standard). For the text ofU.C.C. § 1-201(19) see
supra text accompanying note 12. For a discussion of its subjective standard, see supra notes 18-27 and
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The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in lender
cases was applied to the borrower-lender relationship in K.M. C.
Co. v. Irving Trust Co. 161 In K.M. C., the lender was held liable for
bad faith when it discontinued financing the debtor on a line of
credit secured by a "blocked account" of all the debtor's accounts
receivable.162 The lender held a security interest in all of K.M.C.'s
accounts receivable and inventory, in exchange for which K.M.C.
received a line of credit. 163 Under the blocked account
arrangement, K.M.C. deposited all of its account receipts into an
account to which only the lender had access. 164 After the lender
refused to continue lending to K.M.C., the business had no money
to continue operation because all of its receipts were tied up in the
blocked account and the business failed. 
1 65
The lender in K.M. C. argued that it had no legal obligation to
advance funds under the financing agreement and thus could refuse
to lend to K.M.C. at any time. 166 The debtor contended, however,
that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing required the lender
to give the debtor notice before discontinuing financing. 167 The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals did not base liability on a breach of
duty to extend funds, but the court held that the lender was liable
for failing to notify the borrower of its decision to discontinue the
financing in advance, which would have provided the borrower an
opportunity to obtain alternative financing. 168 The court concluded
that unless an obligation of good faith was imposed upon the
lender, K.M.C. would continue to exist only at the "whim or
mercy" of the lender. 
169
accompanying text. For a case using the subjective standard, see Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603
F.2d 1367, 1379 (9th Cir. 1979) (good faith requires acceleration be reasonable in light of the facts
existing at the time); see also First Texas Say. Ass'n v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179, 182
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (good faith obligation of lender regarding refusal to loan money to debtor
under loan commitment existed, although court did not indicate source of the obligation).
161. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
162. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985).
163. Id. at 754.
164. Id. at 759.
165. Id. at 754, 759.
166. Id. at 759.
167. Id. at 754.
168. Id. at 759. The court in K.M.C. stated that if some notice had been given to the borrower,
it would have been a different case. Id. at 763. The court in K.M.C. did not expand on how this
would have affected its analysis of the lender's actions, but assumedly the inquiry would then have
focused on whether such notice was reasonably given. The court did state, however, that "[t]hejury
was entitled to find that a reasonable notice period would not change the ability of K.M.C. to pay the
loan." Id. at 762. This seems to indicate that the lender would have prevailed had1 reasonable notice
been given. The lender argued that even if a period of notice were required, it would be unreasonable
to impose on it an obligation to continue financing K.M.C. for the time it would take to arrange the
alternative financing. Id. at 763. The court stated that the availability of alternative financing was a
causation factor, and was not relevant to whether the lender acted in good faith in regard to the
notice requirement. Id.
169. Id. at 759.
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The court reasoned that this obligation of good faith required
the lender to give the borrower a period of notice before
discontinuing financing under the line of credit. 170 Therefore, since
no notice was given to the debtor, and the lender failed to show that
its refusal to lend funds without that notice was in good faith, the
lender was liable for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. 171
The lender in K.M. C. was held not to the subjective standard
of good faith found under the Uniform Commercial Code, 172 but to
a standard which required that the lender show there was at least
some objective basis for the actions of its loan officer. 17 3 If the
lender could show that there was a valid business reason for the
refusal to continue lending without prior notice, the lender would
not be liable for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. 74 In K.M.C. the court held that the loan officer's
170. Id. The court in K.M.C. cited two sources for the proposition that good faith requires a
lender to give notice prior to discontinuing credit. Id. First, it quoted language from Wells v.
Alexander, which stated that "ifa notice was requisite to its proper execution, a covenant to give such
notice will be inferred, for any other construction would make the contract unreasonable, and place
one of the parties entirely at the mercy of the other."Id. (quoting Wells v. Alexander, 130 N.Y. 642,
642, 29 N.E. 142, 143 (1891)). Secondly, the court cited S 2-309 comment 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which states that "the application of principles of good faith and sound
commercial practice normally call for such notification of the termination of a going contract
relationship as will give the other party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement." Id.; see
U.C.C. 5 2-309 comment 8 (1978).
171. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 759.
172. Id. at 761; see U.C.C. 5 1-201(19) (1978). The court in K.M.C. stated that if it were
required to use the subjective standard found under the Uniform Commercial Code, it might feel
constrained to hold that the lender's actions were not in bad faith. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 761. The
loan officer who made the decision not to continue financing K.M.C. apparently did so because it
did not appear that even with additional money K.M.C. would be able to meet its debts and
continue in business. Id. at 762. Subjectively, the lender argued, it had cause to discontinue
financing. Id.
173. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 761. In K.M.C., the lender's loan officer claimed that he decided not
to advance K.M.C. the money it had requested on its line of credit because even with that money
K.M.C. could not meet its bills. Id. at 762. The court conceded that the officer could reasonably
have held such a belief. Id. at 763.
The lender contended that it must be found to have acted in bad faith, which it defined as akin
to dishonesty, in order to be held liable for breach of the implied covenant, but this contention was
rejected by the court. Id. at 760. The court's inquiry was whether the lender abused its discretion in
cutting off the financing. Id. This did not require a finding of bad faith, but rather was an objective
analysis of the basis of the decision. Id. In choosing this standard, the court in essence applied the
more objective criteria adopted by some courts in Uniform Commercial Code good faith cases. See,
e.g., Black v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 437 So.2d 26, 29-30 (Miss. 1983) (reasonableness standard
added to Uniform Commercial Code definition of good faith); see also U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978) (every
contract imposes an obligation of good faith upon the parties to the agreement). For a discussion of
this objective approach, see supra notes 50-78 and 87-111 and accompanying text. The court in
K.M.C. avoided the conflict experienced by courts interpreting the Code, however, by using the
implied covenant of good faith, not the Code's good faith. See K.M. C., 757 F.2d at 759. It was not,
therefore, necessary for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to defer to the Code's subjective
definition. See id.
174. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 761. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in K.M.C. stated that the
loan officer was not required to be correct in his belief in order to establish there was a valid business
reason for his actions, but his belief would be tested by objective standards. Id. In this case, another
lender who participated in the financing arrangement testified that he believed a period of notice was
required for good faith, and that "any reasonable banker looking at the loan would agree that [the
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belief that the debtor's financial condition was poor did not warrant
the decision to discontinue financing without further notice. 75
In determining that the lender in K.M. C. was required to give
notice to the borrower in order to act in good faith, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals placed some emphasis on the extensive
course of dealing between the two parties. 17 6 A similar emphasis on
this element can be found in other cases. 1
77
Because the court in K.M. C. based its findings on the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and awarded damages for
breach of that covenant, 178 it can be criticized for applying a new
basis of liability when more traditional contract concepts such as
estoppel and wrongful repossession were available. 179 Furthermore,
the K.M. C. decision can be criticized because the standard of
behavior required by the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is harder to define than that found under the Uniform
Commercial Code. 180 Perhaps as a response to this definitional
problem, courts have been reluctant to apply the K.M. C. rationale
in other cases. 181
The holding in K.M. C. can be seen as restricted to cases in
which there could be no plausible reason for the lender to refuse to
loan] was fully secured." Id. at 761-62. Given the fact that the officer knew or should have known
that the bank was fully secured on the line of credit, the decision not to advance further funds without
notice could not be justified. Id. at 763. The lender failed to establish that it had such an objective
basis for its abrupt behavior, and, therefore, it was liable for breach of the financing agreement. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 759. The court in K.M.C. characterized the relationship between the lender and
debtor as "a consistent and uninterrupted course of dealing between the parties over an extended
period of time." Id. This course of dealing apparently entitled the borrower to rely on the continued
financing under the line of credit, and to expect notification should the lender decide to discontinue
that financing. See id.
177. See, e.g., Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 292-93JAlaska 1983) (lender liable for
wrongful conversion and breach of good faith because negotiation of loan refinancing amounted to
course of dealing modifying terms of contract and requiring notice before repossession).
178. K.M. C., 757 F.2d at 755, 766.
179. See, e.g., Alaska Statebank, 674 P.2d at 293-94 (Alaska 1983) (lender liable for conversion,
wrongful dishonor, and defamation after deeming itself insecure on a debt and repossessing the
collateral by closing debtor's store and dishonoring his checks).
180. See U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1978) (honesty in fact in the transaction). Under the Code, the
standard of good faith is specifically defined. See id. The use of the implied covenant introduces
objective standards which are analyzed by reference to the reasonable person. See K.M. C., 757 F.2d
at 761 (conduct of lender must be measured by objective standards). Some cases have interpreted
good faith under the Code to include a requirement that the lender's actions be objectively
reasonable, and have had no difficulty defining what standard of behavior this requires. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1379 (9th Cir. 1979) (good faith requires reasonable
belief that the security is impaired). Additionally, from this perspective, the inclusion of a standard
similar to that of the merchant, that of commercially reasonable behavior, does not seem out of place.
For a discussion of the merchant's standard, see supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Washburn v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 151 Il1. App. 3d 21, -, 502
N.E.2d 739, 743 (1986) (K.M.C. factually is "plainly distinguishable" from case at bar, a suit for
wrongful sale of collateral and not for refusal to lend); Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, 715
S.W.2d 944, 953 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (lender in case at bar, unlike lender in K.M.C., did not
require deposit of all receipts in blocked account, and, therefore, K.M.C. can be distinguished); see
also, Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., 485 So.2d 1336, 1341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (holding in K.M.C. questionable because demand notes have no requirement of good faith).
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make the loan, without notice, except out of some arbitrary and
capricious motivation.18 2 To date, the most extensive court
discussion of what K.M. C. and the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing requires of a lender who decides to discontinue
financing is found in East Lansing State Bank v. Red Cedar Construction
Co. 183
In Red Cedar, the debtor claimed that the lender breached its
duty under the implied covenant when it refused to loan the debtor
additional money to fund its building projects. 184 The lender and
the debtor in Red Cedar had a continuing relationship, dating back
to 1967, during which time a number of loans had been made to the
debtor.18 5 The debtor had paid these loans off, and had never been
refused financing by the lender.18 6 The debtor subsequently began
to experience financial difficulties, and after a dispute arose
between the parties regarding the purpose of future loans, the
lender refused to advance the debtor the working-capital loans the
debtor had requested. 1
8 7
According to the debtor in Red Cedar, K.M. C. stood for the
proposition that general principles of commercial fairness required
the lender to make the loan to the debtor.' 88 The bankruptcy court
in Red Cedar, however, rejected the opportunity to expand the
holding of K.M. C. to mean that there could be liability for failure to
make a loan to the debtor as a general principle of fairness.' 89
The bankruptcy court in Red Cedar made special note of the
fact that the holding in K.M. C. was based on the lack of adequate
notice, rather than on the lender's failure to make a loan.1 90 The
court stated that a necessary prerequisite to a finding of liability in
these cases is the existence of an enforceable agreement to make a
182. See K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 761 (no reasonable bank officer in same situation would have
refused to finance the debtor without notice).
183.63 Bankr. 228 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
184. East Lansing State Bank v. Red Cedar Constr. Co. (In re Red Cedar Constr. Co.), 63
Bankr. 228, 235 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
185. Id. at 230.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 231-32. In Red Cedar, the parties discussed a working capital loan, but no promise to
make the loan was made. Id. at 234. Furthermore, the debtor was informed that it was unrealistic to
expect such a loan, because the capital had to be generated internally by the company. Id. at 239.
The bankruptcy court held that this was sufficient notice to the debtor that future financing might
not be forthcoming. Id. The money loaned to the debtor was distributed to the debtor in satisfaction
of the debtor's pre-existing debt. Id. at 232.
188. Id. at 235-36.
189. Id. The debtor in Red Cedar encouraged the court to read K.M. C. broadly so as to impose a
good faith duty to make a loan predicated upon the fact that the lender had always made loans to it in
the past. Id. at 239. The court refused to give K.M.C. so broad an application. Id. Instead, the court





loan.' 91 Moreover, even with such an agreement, the lender would
be required to give notice only if the debtor objectively qualified for
a loan under the lender's eligibility guidelines. 92 According to the
bankruptcy court, a debtor could only be placed in a position of
relying on the continuing relationship with the lender if the debtor
were in a position to obtain financing from this lender as if it were
any general customer of the bank. 193 If the debtor did not qualify
for financing under the lender's guidelines, it had no reason to
expect continued financing. 1
94
Although the bankruptcy court in Red Cedar found that the
lender had indeed given notice to the debtor that it would no longer
lend it money when it told the debtor it was unrealistic to expect a
working capital loan, the court went on to state that the duty to give
such notice had not even arisen in this case. 195 The fact that the
debtor was in serious financial trouble and that the lender knew of
this condition, meant that the lender was under no obligation to
give notice of its intention to refuse any subsequent loans. 196 The
court also failed to find that a commitment to make a loan ever
existed, but rather only a promise to consider making a loan.' 97
Thus, the initial prerequisite for liability under K.M.C., namely
the existence of an enforceable agreement to make a loan, did not
exist. 198 Therefore, no duties under the K.M.C. rule could have
been imposed on this lender at all. 199
The standard articulated in K.M.C. requires the lender to
show a valid business reason for the decision to discontinue
financing without notice to the debtor. 200 This appears to be the
basis for the discussion in Red Cedar regarding the fact that the
debtor's serious financial condition was justification for the lender's
191. Id.
192. Id. at 238. The court in Red Cedar stated that if the debtor did not by objective measure
otherwise qualify for a loan, it could not expect to continue to receive financing just because it had
obtained it in the past. See id. This analysis would entail looking to see if the debtor was capable of
payment or performance on any additional loans. See id.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. Id. at 239.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. The debtor in Red Cedar failed to show that the lender had done anything more than
agree to consider the making of a loan in the future. Id. at 240. The court stated that this "[did] not
satisfy the requirement of K.M.C. that there be an irrevokable [sic] agreement between the parties
before a lender can be found liable for failure to act in good faith with its customer." Id.; see K.M.C.
Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985) (lender agreed to finance line of credit
which was secured by debtor's accounts receivable).
A similar result can be seen in Central Bank v. Eystad, wherein the bank was found to have no
good faith duty to continue renewing a loan simply because it had previously done so on this and
other loans. Central Bank v. Eystad, 710 P.2d 710, 713-14 (Mont. 1985).
199. Red Cedar, 63 Bankr. at 239.
200. K.M. C., 757 F.2d at 763.
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decision not to lend any further money. 20 1 In K.M. C. the total loan
commitment was fully secured. 20 2 Thus, there was no valid reason
for the lender not to lend to K.M.C. In Red Cedar, however, there
was a valid business reason for not making the loan because the
debtor had a very poor debt/equity ratio and was experiencing
serious cash flow problems. 20 3 Unlike the lender in K.M.C., the
lender in Red Cedar was not found to be acting in an arbitrary and
capricious manner, and accordingly, no liability for breach of the
implied covenant arose. 
204
B. TORT RECOVERY FOR BREACH QF THE IMPLIED COVENANT
Once the court agrees that there was a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the next question that
arises is whether the suit sounds in contract and thus, the debtor is
compelled to accept contract damages, or whether there can be
recovery in tort. It has been argued that cases involving the implied
covenant sound in contract and do not support awards of tort
damages because the relationship between the debtor and the
lender is contractual in nature, and the action is one for breach of
contract. 20 5 As this section will illustrate, however, some courts
have held that there is tort liability for the breach of the implied
covenant.
1. Tort Damages as Punishment for Intolerable Lender Behavior
Generally, there can be no recovery in tort for breach of
contract. 20 6 To recover damages in tort, a plaintiff must have a
separate independent tort cause of action.20 7 This tort claim must
201. See Red Cedar, 63 Bankr. at 238-39.
202. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 761.
203. Red Cedar, 63 Bankr. at 239.
204. Compare K.M. C., 757 F.2d at 763 (because lender was fully secured and had policy to give
notice to debtor before discontinuing financing if it was adequately secured, failure to do so was
arbitrary and capricious and resulted in liability for breach of the implied covenant) with Red Cedar,
63 Bankr. at 239 (debtor's serious financial condition established that prospect of performance was
impaired and lender violated no duty by discontinuing financing because of its knowledge of the
debtor's situation).
205. See, e.g., First Texas Say. Ass'n v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179, 187 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982) (suit regarding lender's bad faith refusal to lend is for breach of contract and no
exemplary damages are available); see also Central Bank v. Eystad, 710 P.2d 710, 714 (Mont. 1985)
(breach of Uniform Commercial Code good faith not sufficient for award of punitive damages
without showing of oppressive conduct beyond the statutory obligation).
206. See 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 10, § 1340, at 210 (3rd ed. 1968) (no tort recovery for
breach of contract claim as general rule). But see Alaska Stateb'ank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 298-99
(Alaska 1983) (award of punitive damages to debtor for lender's actions in accelerating a debt
affirmed on appeal).
207. Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 536-37 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (debtor must establish tortious breach of duty in order to recover punitive damages for lack of
good faith because breach of contract under the Uniform Commercial Code does not provide a cause
ofaction in tort).
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be separately alleged and prov n.2 °8 One exception to this rule
arises when the debtor can show that the lender's behavior was
intolerable to such a degree that the court involved determines that
punitive damages must be awarded in order to punish the lender
for its behavior.20 9
Failure of the trial court to consider an award of punitive
damages resulted in a remand for a new trial in First National Bank
v. Twombly.21t In Twombly, the debtor brought a countersuit to the
lender's action to foreclose on a delinquent promissory note,
alleging that the lender had breached its duty of good faith under
the Uniform Commercial Code by not converting a promissory
note into an installment note after a bank officer had assured the
debtor that the bank would convert the note. 2t5 The Montana
Supreme Court stated that punitive damages would be available in
this case if the lender's conduct was sufficiently culpable to meet the
statutory requirements for the imposition of punitive damages.
212
The court stated that the jury could have found that the statutory
requirements for imposition of punitive damages were met because
the lender acted fraudulently and in reckless disregard of the rights
of the debtors. 213 Therefore, the court concluded that the issue of
punitive damages should have been introduced at trial. 2
14
208. First Texas, 631 S.W.2d 179, 188 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Crutcher-Rolfs-
Cummings, Inc. v. Ballard, 540 S.W.2d 380, 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910
(1977)).
209. Se, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 41 Mont. 1948 _ 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (1984)
(lender liable for punitive damages because it acted in reckless ,nd malicious disregard of debtor's
rights).
210. 11 Iviont. 1948 ,---- 689 P 2d 1226, 1230 (1984).
211. First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 41 Mont. 1948, - , 689 P.2d 1226, 1227 (1984). The
debtor in T'wnbly testified that the bank officer knew the debtor was out of work and worried about
tie repayment of the loan, and that this is why the debtor wished to convert the loan so that it was
payable in installments. Id. at __ , 689 P.2d at 1228.
212. Id. at , 689 P.2d at 1230. To recover punitive damages in Montana, the debtor had to
show the existence of malice, oppression, or faud. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1985) (punitive
damages require showing of malice, fraud, or oppression). The court in Twombly stated that malice
exists when it is shown that a person knows or should have known of the facts which created a high
degree of risk of harm to the other party's rights, and proceeded to act in unreasonable disregard of
that risk. ld. at -- ,, 689 P.2d at 1230 (quoting Owens v. Parker Drilling Co., 41 Mont. 66, 69, 676
P.2d 162, 164 (1984)).
213, Id. at -, 689 P.2d at 1230. The debtor in Tvombly testified that he had expended the
itoney that be had allocated fur repayment on the note, in reliance on the promise by the bank officer
that the note would be converted into an installment debt. Id. at -, 689 P.2d at 1228. A second
officer, who was supposed to handle the conversion, subsequently informed the debtor that he knew
nothing of the promise and would not be able to convert the loan because the debtor was in no
position to guarantee payment. Id. at _ , 689 P.2d at 1228, The actions of the officer who
or igially assured the debtor that the loan would be converted were found to be in reckless disregard
of tie risk that the debtor would rely on his promise and change positions to the debtor's detriment.
Id. at ... 689 P.2d at 1230.
214, Id. at -... 689 P.26 at 1230; accordSkeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 816
(3d Cir. 1964) (award of punitive damages available if actions of the creditor are clearly outrageous
irs nature). Skeels is a repossession case, in which the creditor had a security interest in all of the
debtor's tars. Skeels, 335 F.2d at 848. The debtor, an automobile dealer, was to pay the creditor
proptly upon sale of these vehicles, but over a period ofa week or two, the debtor had sold nine cars
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In contrast, the California Court of Appeal rejected a debtor's
attempt to bring an action against the lender in tort for failure to
maintain insurance on the secured collateral. 215 In Sawyer v. Bank of
America, 216 the debtor alleged that the lender breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it refused to pay for
the loss of his pickup after it was destroyed by fire. 
217
The California Court of Appeal stated that the tort of breach
of the implied covenant consists of a bad faith action, extraneous to
the contract. 21 8 The court reasoned that in order for a tort of breach
of implied covenant to lie, the facts must show that the lender acted
in a manner intended to frustrate the debtor's enjoyment of the
contract.2 19 The court concluded that the only grounds for suit were
in contract, and thus an award of punitive damages was not
upheld. 2
20
A reconciliation of the cases leads to a conclusion that a debtor
may be able to recover tort damages from the lender if he or she can
show that the lender's actions were so outrageous that the court
agrees imposition of such damages is warranted, but not if the
lender's actions were not intended to frustrate the rights of the
debtor under the contract. 
221
without remitting the money to the creditor. Id. The creditor then took possession of the dealership
and seized the remaining stock. Id. The dealership was closed for a period of two days during which
time the creditor removed all of the cars in stock. Id. The debtor was not able to finance new stock
and the dealership never reopened. Id. at 848-49. The debtor argued that the behavior was
outrageous because the creditor had acquiesced to similar delays in the past, and because the parties
were negotiating for additional financing at the time of the seizure. Id. at 849. The court of appeals
stated, however, that there had been no showing that the employees who seized the vehicles or their
superiors were aware of any reasons why such seizure was not warranted under the security
agreement, because the debtor had apparently been dealing with one employee of the bank who had
not told any other bank personnel about the negotiations. Id. at 852.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated that although pursuant to Pennsylvania law, an
employer could be liable for punitive damages for the acts of its employees, where the actors
themselves were ignorant of the dealings with the debtor, the actions of the creditor simply were not
"clearly outrageous." Id. The court indicated, however, that if the actions of the employees were
found to be clearly outrageous, the debtor could recover punitive damages from the lender. Id.
215. Sawyer v. Bank of America, 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, , 145 Cal. Rptr. 623, 626 (1974).
216. 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1974).
217. Sawyer v. Bank of America, 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, , 145 Cal. Rptr. 623, 625 (1974). In
Sawyer, the debtor's pickup truck was destroyed by fire after the insurance coverage on the vehicle
had lapsed. Id. at __ , 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625. The security agreement signed by the parties
indicated that if the debtor failed to provide insurance for the pickup truck, the seller "may obtain
the same." Id. at __, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625. In regard to this vehicle and four others also financed
through the lender, the debtor's general practice was to not obtain the insurance, but instead to rely
on the lender to do so. Id. at __ , 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625. Due to a clerical oversight, the lender failed
to renew the policy on the pickup truck and the policy lapsed. Id. at__ , 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
218. Id. at.-, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
219. Id. at __ , 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625. Cf Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167,
174, 610 P.2d 1330, 1334, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 (1980) (California has long recognized a wrongful
act committed in contractual relationship may give rise to tort liability).
220. Sawyer, 83 Cal. App. 3d at__ , 145 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
221. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v.'Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Mont. 1984) (lender subject
to liability for punitive damages for failure to convert debtor's loan after representation that it would
do so). For a discussion of the standard of behavior necessary to impose tort damages, see supra notes
209-14 and accompanying text.
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2. Tort Damages for Violation of Statutory Duties
A debtor may also be entitled to punitive damages when the
creditor's actions violate a statutory duty. 222 In Young v. Bank of
America, 223 the creditor's actions constituted a cause of action in tort
because the creditor breached a duty imposed by statute. 224 The
debtor's credit card had been stolen and used by an unauthorized
person. 225 The debtor discovered the theft and reported it to the
creditor, but the creditor refused to credit her balance for the
unauthorized purchases and demanded that she pay for them.
226
Pursuant to California statute, a cardholder was not liable for
unauthorized use of the credit card if the cardholder notified the
card issuer within a reasonable time after discovery of the theft. 227
When the creditor did not comply with this statute, a breach of a
statutory duty occurred in addition to a breach of contract. 228 The
California Court of Appeal in Young concluded that because the
creditor had breached a legal duty owed to the debtor, the debtor
could sue the creditor and recover punitive damages for all harm
proximately caused by the creditor's breach of duty. 229
3. The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract
In the area of insurance law, a separate tort claim for bad faith
breach of contract has developed. 230  This tort stems from the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but the recovery is
222. See Young v. Bank of America, 141 Cal. App. 3d 108, 113, 190 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 (1983)
(creditor liable for tort damages when it violated duty owed to debtor to credit debtor's account for
unauthorized use of her credit card).
223. 141 Cal. App. 3d 108, 190 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1983).
224. Young v. Bank of America, 141 Cal. App. 3d 108, 113, 190 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126(1983).
225. Id. at 113, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
226. Id. at 112, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25. The debtor was also refused credit by another creditor
because of the unfavorable rating that resulted after this incident. Id. at 112, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
227. Id. at 112, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 125; see CAL. Civ. CODE 5 1747.20 (West 1982) (repealed
1982) (cardholder not liable for any unauthorized use of the card if cardholder notified card issuer
within a reasonable time after discovery of the theft).
228. Young, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 113, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
229. Id. at 113, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 126. The debtor in Young was awarded damages for emotional
distress that resulted from the card issuer's refusal to credit her account. Id. at 115, 190 Cal. Rptr. at
127.
230. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 17 (1967) (breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing imposed on insurance carrier
gave rise to a cause of action in tort). In Crisci, the duty owed by the insurance carrier was
characterized as one which required it to consider the interests of the insured when considering
settlement offers. Id. at 430, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17. This implied duty was imposed
because of the special relationship between the carrier and the insured. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818, 620 P.2d 141, 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 696 (1979). The special
relationship exists because insurance is obtained not for commercial advantage on the part of the
insured, but rather to provide peace of mind and security. Id. at 819, 620 P.2d at 145, 169 Cal. Rptr.
at 695. The insurer was required to protect these interests when handling the insured's claim. Id. at
819, 620 P.2d at 145, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
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in tort. 231 If the insurer refuses an offered settlement of an
insurance claim when the most reasonable manner of disposing of
the claim is by accepting the settlement, the insurer may be liable to
the insured.
232
Liability to the insured is based upon the finding that the
insurer knew there was a considerable risk of recovery substantially
beyond the limits of the policy and the insurer did not give as much
consideration to the financial interests of the insured in its decision
as it did to its own interests. 233 The insurer need not have acted
with actual dishonesty, but rather the test is whether the insurer
gave reasonable consideration to the interests of the insured. 
234
It has been argued that an analogy to the tort of bad faith
breach of contract should be made in the context of the borrower-
lender relationship. 235 In Wagner v. Benson,2 36 the debtors, in order
to finance an investment in a cattle raising program, obtained a
loan from the lender which required the debtors to keep the balance
of the loan obligation at not more than 75% of the value of the
cattle, which was the collateral securing the debt. 237 After the
lender asked the debtors to make a payment to reduce the amount
of the loan balance to the 75% level and the debtors refused, the
cattle were sold and the proceeds applied to the loan balance.2 38
The debtors alleged that the bank acted in bad faith because
the bank had a duty to inform the debtors about the handling of
investments financed by the lender.2 39 The debtors claimed that
this duty to disclose information about the. handling of the
investment should be imposed on the lender independently of the
express contractual duties of the lender. 
240
The California Court of Appeal indicated that a bad faith
cause of action sounding in tort had not been extended beyond
insurance cases, but went on to "assum[e] but not decid[e]" that
such a cause of action may arise from a borrower-lender
231. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19. This tort constitutes a
claim that the insurer harmed the insured willfully and in bad faith, and is, therefore, liable for
compensatory and exemplary damages. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.
App. 3d 376, 410, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (1970) (breach of duty in tort by insurer for malicious and
willful refusal to pay legitimate claim).
232. See, e.g., Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 430-31, 426 P.2d at 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17 (liability
may exist whenever settlement is the most reasonable manner of disposing of case and insurer refuses
to settle).
233. Id. at 432, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
234. Id. at 432, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
235. Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 33, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (1980).
236. 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980).
237. Id. at 31, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
238. Id. at31, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
239. Id. at 33, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
240. Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
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relationship.2 4' The court recognized that in some factual
situations, public policy played a major role in determining the
standard of conduct required of the parties, and that tort liability is
imposed in those situations to achieve a desirable social climate. 42
The court noted that in insurance cases, "social standards of fair
dealing define reasonable conduct on the part of insurers in bad
faith cases as consistent with public expectations.... ",243
The court did not find that the lender's actions violated these
"social standards" because public policy does not impose upon the
lender an absolute duty to disclose management information about
the business ventures it finances. 24 4 The court indicated that,
although the covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in
addition to any contractual obligation, the nature and extent of the
duty the covenant imposes are determined by the agreement itself,
and the success of this investment was simply not a benefit of the
agreement which the lender had an obligation to protect. 
245
The tort of bad faith breach of contract has been extended
beyond insurance cases, but not yet to the borrower-lender
relationship.2 46 The element of a special relationship between the
241. Id. at 33-34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520. In Wagner, the California Court of Appeal found the
bank's actions in this case not to be tortious, and therefore, it did not have to decide whether the
debtor had a cause of action in tort. Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
242. Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
243. Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520. Public policy was seen by the court in Wagner as playing a
large role in the definition of the standard of conduct for insurance carriers because the purpose of
the liability was to achieve a "desirable social climate." Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520. Social
standards of fair dealing defined what was reasonable for an insurer to do, and also what was
reasonable for a lender to do. Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520. The duty of good faith extends to the
protection of the benefits of the contract. Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 521. Here, the debtor wanted
the bank's duty to include telling the debtor how safe the debtor's choice of investment was, and that
went beyond what the covenant required. Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
244. Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520-21.
245. Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520-21.
246. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769, 686
P.2d 1158, 1167,206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984) (lender subject to liability for tortious denial of valid
contract for delivery of fuel oil). In Seamen's, the California Supreme Court declined to state that a
tort action is always available when the covenant of good faith is breached. Id. at 770, 686 P.2d at
1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. Instead, the court stated that "[i]t is sufficient to recognize that a party
to a contract may incur tort remedies when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield
itself from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract exists." Id.
at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. The court went on to note that it was not a tort to
deny liability under a contract, as long as the denial is honest and done in good faith. Id. at 771, 686
P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
The dissent in Seaman's would have had the court make a firm statement that a tort cause of
action was available based on the prior authority that the court had established. Id. at 776, 686 P.2d
at 1171, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the court must first
determine the reasonable expectations of the parties to the contract as evidenced by the terms of their
agreement. Id. at 777, 686 P.2d at 1171, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). The
parties will then be required to act reasonably in light of the rights and liabilities imposed by those
expectations. Id. at 777, 686 P.2d at 1172, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). When the
possibility of breach of contract is not accepted or reasonably expected by the parties, a cause of
action in tort should be available. Id. at 781, 686 P.2d at 1174, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting). Ifa party breaches an acknowledged contract, such a breach would constitute a violation
of the duty of good faith in and of itself, and there would be no requirement that the plaintiff show
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parties to the contract has been seen as the determinative factor in
the decision whether to allow a tort action for breach of the
covenant.24 7 This special relationship is present in insurance cases
because the contract is entered into not for commercial advantage
or profit, but rather for peace of mind, protection, or some other
intangible purpose that is not primarily commercial in nature. 248
This relationship is not usually present in the borrower-lender
relationship. One commentator, however, suggests that unless the
presence of a special relationship is essential to satisfy the
underlying purpose behind the tort, there is no reason why the tort
of bad faith breach of contract cannot be extended into other areas
of the law .
24 9
The tort of bad faith breach of contract stems from the duty of
good faith and fair dealing implied into every contract. 250 It does
not allow one party to a contract to unreasonably disregard the
interests of the other party in order to obtain some financial
benefit.
251
Although the tort of bad faith breach of contract applies in an
insurance context, it has not been extended to the lender-borrower
relationship. The nature of the relationship between lender and
borrower is not the same as that of insurer and insured because the
contract between insured and insurer is not entered into by the
insured to obtain pecuniary gain. 252 The general policy behind the
bad faith on the part of the breaching party. Id. at 782, 686 P.2d at 1175, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 371
(Bird, CJ., dissenting). When the claim is the denialofa contract, however, as it was in this case, the
dissent would still require a showing ofbad faith. Id. at 762, 686 P.2d at 1175, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 371
(Bird, C.J., dissenting).
247. See Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, -, 726 P.2d 565, 574 (1986). The court in
Rawlings stated that a cause of action in tort was allowed if the contract was one in which there was a
special relationship because the plaintiff was not seeking commercial advantage or profit from the
defendant, such as in insurance cases, or if there was a special need to provide deterrence against
breach by the party who derives a commercial benefit from the contract. Id. at-, 726 P.2d at 574-
75. The court was concerned that in these circumstances, allowing only contract damages for breach
of contract provided more of an incentive for breach of the contract than for its performance because
the amount of contract damages may be less than the cost of performance. Id. at __, 726 P.2d at
576.
248. See, e.g., id. at-__, 726 P.2d at 575. In Rawlings the court characterized the cases in which
the tort of bad faith breach of contract was applied as involving defendants who had an "evil hand,"
rather than an "evil mind." Id. at __ , 726 P.2d at 576. The court indicated that there need not be
an intent to harm the plaintiff, but rather the actor must only have intended to act while lacking a
reasonable belief that such act was permitted by the contract. Id. at -, 726 P.2d at 576. In the
context of insurance cases, because of the special nature of the contract entered into by the parties,
the court stated that the insurer would be liable when it either knew that its position was unsupported
by the insurance policy, or when it failed to adequately investigate the support for the position it had
taken. Id. at__ , 726 P.2d at 576.
249. Diamond, The Tort Of Bad Faith Breach Of Contract: When, If At All, Should It Be Extended
BeyondInsurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 425, 430-31 (1980-81).
250. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, __, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13,
17(1967).
251. Id. at -, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
252. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 819, 620 P.2d 141, 145, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 691, 695 (1979) (insurance is not obtained for commercial benefit but rather for peace of mind
NOTE
tort, to prevent unjust regard for a parties rights to a contract, is
nonetheless equally applicable to the lender-borrower context. Tort
damages have been awarded to borrowers for breach of the implied
duty of good faith. 253 Therefore, the tort of bad faith breach of
contract is essentially an end run application of what had already
been applied to the lender-borrower relationship, and it would not
be inconsistent to apply it to that relationship.
As this discussion illustrates, there is not a consensus as to
whether the lender will be liable in either tort or contract for the
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. There
may, however, also be common-law grounds for liability in these
cases. 254
IV. LENDER LIABILITY UNDER COMMON LAW TORT
THEORIES
Liability grounded in common law is not based on the contract
or any implied covenants, but rather on tort theories. The debtor
must establish all of the basic elements of the tort cause of action in
order for the lender to be found liable to the debtor. 255 The debtor
generally must show a breach of some duty owed to it by the
creditor, and it is in this area that the debtor often fails. 25 6
Additionally, the creditor often escapes liability by raising a
business justification for its actions. 257 Although these theories of
liability exist, it is because of the difficulty of establishing the
elements of the torts that the breach of good faith theories have
gained momentum in recent years.
A number of common-law tort theories of liability may be
applicable to the borrower-lender relationship. Perhaps most
prominent among these theories are fraud, duress, tortious
interference, and prima facie tort. 258 Debtors who have tried to
and security). For a discussion of the special relationship between insurer and insured, see supra note
247.
253. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 41 Mont. 1948, -, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (1984)
(lender liable for punitive damages because it acted in reckless disregard of debtor's rights).
254. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 669 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984)
(lender liable for fraud, duress, and tortious interference).
255. See, e.g., Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 686 (although clause in loan agreement allowed lender to
accelerate debt upon default of debtor, lender was liable for common-law duress for threatening to
use it in an unauthorized manner).
256. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 307 Minn. 487, 488, 238 N.W.2d 218, 219
(1976) (bank's representation to debtor did not create a duty upon which to base a cause of action).
257. See, e.g., Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 544 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986) (lender not liable for prima facie tort where it acted for business reasons in exercising
contract rights).
258. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 669 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984)
(lender liable for fraud, duress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Shaughnessy v.
Mark Twain State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944, 948 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (cause of action for prima facie
1988]
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hold lenders liable on these theories have been met with varying
degrees of success. 2 9 It is, however, important to be aware of the
scope of liability presented under these theories because they may
expand lender liability in cases where the lender's actions, though
harmful, do not violate the subjective good faith standard of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
A. FRAUD
A cause of action in tort for damages may exist if the debtor
can show that the representations made by the lender to the debtor
were fraudulent.2 60 The debtor must prove the elements of
actionable fraud which are as follows: (1) that a false material
representation was made; (2) that the speaker knew the
representation was false when he or she said it, or made it recklessly
without any knowledge of its truth; (3) that the creditor made the
representation with the intention that it should be acted upon by
the party; (4) that the party acted in reliance; and (5) that the party
suffered injury as a result.
261
Perhaps the major case to date imposing liability upon the
lender for its actions during its relationship with the debtor is State
National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 262 In Farah, the debtor,
Farah Manufacturing Company, had been experiencing financial
difficulties and the board of directors was considering electing
William Farah the chief executive officer (CEO), a post he had
previously held. 263 The company's loan agreement with the lender
tort recognized). There are a number of additional theories of liability that have been raised. See, e.g.,
State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) (civil conspiracy);
Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 293 (Alaska 1983) (conversion and defamation); Sanchez-
Corea v. Bank of America, 38 Cal. 3d 892, 908, 701 P.2d 826, 837, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679, 690 (1985)
(emotional distress). There may also be liability under control theories and breach of fiduciary
obligations. See generally Note; Equitable Subordination andAnalogous Theories of Lender Liability: Toward a
New Model of "Control", 65 TEX. L. REv. 801 (1986) (discussion of control and fiduciary theories of
liability).
259. Compare Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 669 (lender liable for fraud, duress and tortious interference)
with Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (no liability for
prima facie tort if lender can show any business justification for its actions).
260. See, e.g., Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (issue of
fact exists regarding lender liability for misrepresentations made by loan officer which lead to
resignation of debtor corporation's officers); Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 516
S.W.2d 138, 143 (Tex. 1974) (lender liable for misrepresenting validity of mortgage and inducing
debtor to make payments to release the mortgage); cf. Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705
S.W.2d 42, 50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (no justified reliance on loan officer when debtor knew all loans
required committee approval).
261. Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 516 S.W.2d 138, 143 (Tex. 1974)
(quoting Wilson v. Jones, 45 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932)).
262. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984). For a detailed analysis of the implications of the
Farah decision, see generally Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40
SW. L.J. 775 (1986).
. 263. State Nat'l Bank % I:arah Mfg. Co., 67' S.W.2d 661, 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
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contained a clause which indicated that it would constitute default
on the loan if the company made any change in the offices of
president and CEO which the lender considered, for any reason
whatsoever, to be adverse to the lender's interests.2
64
The lender had represented to the debtor that it would not
waive the default clause if William Farah was elected CEO. 265 As
a result of this representation, the board elected another person
CEO and then, after the debtor's financial condition did not
improve, it elected a second person. 266 Both of these persons were
approved by the lender.2 67 The debtor continued to have financial
problems, however, until William Farah was finally able to regain
control of the company .268 The debtor sued the lender for fraud and
sought damages for lost profits and sales during the time the lender-
approved CEOs were in office.
269
The Texas Court of Appeals held that the lender was liable for
fraud for representing that it intended to declare the loan in default,
because the lender admitted that it had fully intended to waive the
default clause whether or not William Farah became CEO. 270 The
court stated that the lender could not overcome "the legal and
factual sufficiency of the evidence that the [lender] made false
material representations which [it] knew to be false and which, as
intended, were relied and acted upon by [the debtor]." ,27'
The Texas Court of Appeals in Farah cited no case law
supporting its decision to find the lender liable for fraud in the
borrower-lender context. 272 It simply looked to the established
principles of common-law fraud, found that each element had been
met, and held that the debtor had a cause of action. 27 3 Therefore, if
the debtor can show a knowing and material misrepresentation on
the part of the lender, upon which the lender expects the debtor to
264. Id. at 667.
265. Id. at 673. The lender in Farah was found to have acted fraudulently when one of its
attorneys threatened to bankrupt and close the company upon the election of William Farah. Id.
266. Id. at 674, 677.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 680.
269. Id. at 668, 690.
270. Id. at 668, 681. The court in Farah rejected the lender's contention that these
representations were no more than opinion, judgment, or probability. Id. at 681-82.
271. Id. at 681. The lender in Farah argued that fraud could not arise from a misrepresentation
of future performance, because the injury arises from the nonperformance of the act, which must
occur at some later time. Id. at 682. The court disagreed with this contention, indicating that the
misrepresentation of a state of mind can be the grounds for actionable fraud. Id. The court stated
that the debtor was entitled to a claim for fraud for injuries arising from a promise which was not
intended to be performed when it was made. Id. This was distinguished from situations in which the
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rely and the debtor does rely to his or her detriment, the lender may
be liable for common-law fraud.
274
B. DURESS
A second common-law theory of tort applicable to lender
liability cases is duress. 275 Duress is not necessarily a tort in and of
itself, but usually only gives the wronged party to the contract a
right to rescind the contract and have circumstances returned to the
status quo. 276 It often is used in the borrower-lender context as a
defense in suits to enforce promissory notes.
277
A cause of action may be had, however, for duress as a
separate tort. 278 The debtor must show that: (1) he or she
involuntarily acquiesced to the terms of the contract proposed by
the lender; (2) the circumstances permitted no other alternative;
and (3) the circumstances were the result of coercive acts on the
part of the lender. 27 9 A stumbling block for debtors seeking to raise
a claim of duress is that the first element of the tort requires a
showing that the free agency of the debtor was overcome.
280
In First Texas Savings Association v. Dicker Center, Inc., 281 the
274. Id. For the elements of common-law fraud, see text accompanying note 261. See a/so,
Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America, 38 Cal. 3d 892, 909, 701 P.2d 826, 838, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679, 691
(1985) (lender subject to tort liability for fraudulently forcing debtor to assign all of its accounts
receivable to the lender). In Sanchez-Corea, the debtors sued the lender, contending that the lender
forced them into bankruptcy and alleging, among other contentions, that the lender acted
fraudulently. Id. at 897, 701 P.2d at 829-30, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 682. The California Supreme Court
stated that the jury could have found that the lender acted fraudulently in depianding that the
debtors assign all of their accounts receivable to it, upon the representation that if they did so,
additional funding would be forthcoming. Id. at 909, 701 P.2d at 838, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 691. The
day after the assignment was made, the debtors' request was turned down. Id. at 909, 701 P.2d at
838, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 691. The jury found that the lender had already decided not to approve the
loan when the representations were made. Id. at 909, 701 P.2d at 838, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
Therefore, the lender was liable in tort to the debtor for its fraudulent misrepresentations. Id. at 909,
701! P.2d at 838, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
275. See, e.g., Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 683 (lender liable for duress for coercing debtor into electing
corporate officials of the lender's choice). Duress can be defined as subjecting a person to a pressure
which overcomes the person's will and coerces that person to comply with demands to which he or
she would not ordinarily yield. 17 C.J.S. Contracts, § 168 (1963). The party alleging duress must
show that he or she has been the victim of a wrongful or unlawful act or threat and that such act or
threat deprived the party of his or her unfettered will. 13 S. WILLISTON, supra note 10, § 1617, at 704.
276. 13 S. WILLISTON, supra note 10, § 1627, at 810-11. A court must be shown clear and
convincing evidence of the duress before it will intervene. Id. at 811. Once a cause of action in duress
is recognized, the remedies and defenses applicable in a cause of action for fraud are applied. See id.
at 811-13.
277. See Sea Hoss Marine Enter., Inc. v. Angleton Bank of Commerce, 536 S.W.2d 592, 596
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (debtor not liable on promissory note on grounds that he signed the note
because he was physically afraid of bank officer); Sanders v. Republic Bank, 389 S.W.2d 551, 554
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (debtor not liable on promissory note on grounds he was coerced into signing
the note).
278. See, e.g., Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 688 (debtor established cause of action for duress for lender's
actions in preventing election of corporate officer).
279. 13 S. WILLISTON, supra note 10, §1604, at 665.
280. 13 S. WILLtISTON, supra note 10, § 1602, at 651.
281. 631 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
debtor failed to show that his free agency was overcome by the
actions of the bank.2 82 The debtor and the lender had entered into a
loan commitment to finance a number of office building projects,
for which the debtor paid the lender a nonrefundable commitment
fee and good faith deposit. 283 The lender did not, however, advance
funds on the commitment, and when the debtor demanded the
deposit back, the lender required him to sign a release of liability
regarding the lender's breach of the loan commitment before it
would refund the money.
2 84
The debtor claimed that he signed the release under economic
duress, and would not have done so except for the lender's refusal
to refund the money which he needed badly, without the signed
release. 285 The lender, however, had a right to retain these sums
under the terms of the agreement. 286 Thus, the court reasoned that
it was not duress to threaten an action that the lender had a legal
right to do. 28 7 Furthermore, the court noted that although the
debtor was in economic distress when the release was signed, there
was no showing that this was the result of any acts of the lender. 288
The debtor failed to show that the bank had forced him to sign the
note and, therefore, the debtor did not meet his burden of
establishing all of the elements of the tort of duress.
289
The debtor in State National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 290
was more successful in arguing that the lender should be liable for
duress in its dealings with the debtor. 291 The lender's threats to
declare default of the loan and accelerate the debt under the
management change clause if William Farah was elected CEO were
found to constitute duress because the lender had no valid
justification for making the threats regarding default before the
election actually took place. 292 Although the election of William
Farah to CEO could have constituted default under the
management change clause, the court in Farah stated that there
282. First Texas Say. Ass'n v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 181.
286. Id. at 185.
287. Id.; see Spillers v. Five Points Guar. Bank, 335 So. 2d 851, 852-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976). In Spillers, the Florida District Court of Appeal stated that duress can only occur when the
threat made is to nonexistent legal rights. Spillers, 335 So. 2d at 852. The court concluded that if the
debtor is coerced into signing the instruments only in the sense that they needed money and could
not get it without signing them, it is not duress. Id. at 852.
288. First Texas, 631 S.W.2d at 185-86.
289. Id. at 185.
290. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
291. See State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984). For
the facts of Farah, see supra notes 262-73 and accompanying text.
292. Id. at 686.
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were no circumstances which authorized the manner in which the
threats were made because William Farah had not yet been elected
and thus, the debtor was not in default.2 93 Moreover, the Texas
Court of Appeals indicated that the debtor took on a new obligation
as a result of these threats because the debtor elected not to have
William Farah as CEO. 294 The threats coerced the debtor to do
what it would not have otherwise done. 295 Accordingly, the debtor
had established a cause of action in tort for duress.
296
In summary, the cases establish that in order to recover for the
tort of duress, the debtor will have to show that it was forced to
make a choice it would not have otherwise made, and that this
choice was a result of the lender's actions rather than as a result of
the debtor's own actions regarding the debt.
297
C. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
A claim of tortious interference exists when one party to a
contract intentionally and improperly interferes with the
performance of the contract between another and a third party by
causing the third party to not perform their contractual duties.
298
The plaintiff need not show that the defendant acted with ill will or
evil motive in inducing the third party not to perform, but only that
the acts were willful and intentional. 299 If a lender acts with its own
purposes in mind, however, and not simply to injure the debtor,
293. Id. In Farah, the election of the contested party to chief executive officer perhaps would
have constituted a default, but here the actions of the lender took place prior to this election. Id. The
circumstances did not authorize the warnings made by the lender that it would declare the loan in
default and accelerate the debt. Id.
294. Id. The court in Farah stated that the board of directors of the debtor had no obligation to
prevent the election of William Farah. Id. He could have been elected but for the actions of the
lender in preventing his election. Id. The court also rejected the contention that the debtor agreed to
the lender's terms because they were having pre-existing financial difficulties which were not the
result of any actions on the part of the lender. Id. at 687.
One principle of duress is that the coercion must be created by the defendant. See Sanders v.
Republic Bank, 389 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (voluntary action on part of debtor with
full knowledge of facts and circumstances cannot result in duress even if lender's claim is not
enforceable). The court in Farah stated that the claim of duress did not rest on these pre-existing
conditions as the basis for the submission to the threats of the lender, but upon the acts and conduct
of the lender and the ramifications carried by those threats. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 687.
Additionally, the court in Farah rejected the argument that opinions do not constitute duress. Id.
The court did, however, distinguish one statement of opinion made by an attorney of the lender,
which the court stated was not made by the lender and which was something the debtor could have
conferred with his own counsel about. Id.
295. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 686.
296. Id. at 688.
297. See, e.g., id. at 686-87 (debtor forewent its choice of corporate officer and elected lender-
approved corporate officers as a result of lender's threats to bankrupt the company if they did not).
298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 766 (1979).
299. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 688, 690; cf. Harsha v. State Say. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 799 (Iowa
1984) (deliberate breach of contract may be improper means for interference liability, but actor must
have purpose to injure or destroy).
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there is no liability for interference. 30 In the debtor and lender
context, the debtor may allege that the lender tortiously interfered
with the debtor's business relations by refusing to extend additional
financing.
30 1
In Harsha v. State Savings Bank, 302 the debtor had no cause of
action for interference because it failed to show the lender's refusal
to lend additional money to the debtor was the 'result of an
improper motive to interfere with the debtor's business
prospects. 30 3 The debtor in Harsha, the owner of a feed store, had a
long term loan agreement for $25,000 with the lender. 30 4 The
lender advanced $15,000 to the debtor and then refused to advance
the rest of the funds, claiming displeasure with the debtor's
management of the store. 30 5 The lender subsequently obtained an
interest in a similar business. 306 The debtor claimed that the failure
of the lender to advance the remainder of a long-term line of credit
resulted in the debtor losing prospective business relationships. 30 7
In order to prevail on his claim of tortious interference, the
Iowa Supreme Court in Harsha indicated that the debtor had to
show substantial evidence that the lender acted with a
predominately improper purpose or by improper means when he
decided not to advance the rest of the loan money. 308' The debtor
claimed the improper purpose was that of eliminating him as a
competitor to the lender, who was now the owner of a similar
business. 30 9 This claim failed, however, because the lender did not
acquire the business until after the refusal to advance the money
occurred. 310 This was, therefore, insufficient evidence to establish
300. See, e.g., Farmers Coop. Elevator v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674, 682 (Iowa 1975) (when
bank acts for its own purposes, no liability for prima facie tort). The court in Farah, stated that one is
privileged to interfere when he does so in the bona fide exercise of his own rights or his own equal or
superior interests. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 688.
301. Harsha v. State Say. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 800 (Iowa 1984).
302. 346 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1984).
303. Harsha v. State Say. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 800 (Iowa 1984).
304. Id. at 794.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 795.
307. Id. at 800. In Harsha the debtor claimed that by refusing to advance the final $10,000 of
long-term money, the lender set in motion the forces which ultimately destroyed the debtor's
business and prevented it from having future business relationships. Id.
308. Id. The court in Harsha stated that the problem with the debtor's allegations was that they
were based solely upon circumstantial evidence, and that some of the essential circumstances were
missing. Id. To sustain its burden of proof, the debtor must show that the circumstances have
sufficient probative force to be more than mere speculation. Id. The court stated that substantial
evidence of a connection between the lender's refusal to advance the funds and the lender's later
acquisition of a similar business simply did not appear on the record. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. The debtor in Harsha needed to show that the lender had an interest in the business that
he acquired similar to that of the debtor at the time the decision not to lend the money to the debtor
was made and that the decision was motivated by a desire to eliminate the debtor as a competitor. Id.
The court stated that the alleged nexus between the two transactions in this case did not rise above
the level of suspicion and conjecture, and that this was insufficient to sustain the burden of proof. Id.
T
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 64:273
the improper purpose behind the lender's actions.311
The theory of tortious interference was applied in the debtor's
favor in State National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 312 The debtor
in Farah claimed that the lender's threats to declare default of the
loan constituted tortious interference with the debtor's business.3 13
The Texas Court of Appeals articulated the standard of liability as
follows:
To maintain the action for interference with the contract,
it must be established that (1) there was a contract subject
to interference, (2) the act of interference was willful and
intentional, (3) such intentional act was a proximate
cause of Plaintiff's damage, and (4) actual damage or loss
occurred.
3 14
In Farah the lender argued that its actions were justified
because it had a business interest to protect in the transaction.3 15
The Texas Court of Appeals stated that a justifiable business
interest does not grant an absolute privilege to interfere. 316 Liability
will still follow if, after consideration of the private interests of the
parties and potential harm if the interference is allowed, the
benefits of allowing the interference are clearly outweighed by the
resulting harm. 31 7 Here, the interference with the debtor's elections
311. Id. If the debtor can establish a fiduciary or special relationship between itself and the
debtor, it may be easier for the debtor to show tortious interference. See Commercial Cotton Co. v.
United California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (1985) (bank-depositor
relationship at least quasi-fiduciary in the expectations of the depositor regarding reimbursement for
bank negligence). The general rule, however, is that a lender is not a fiduciary of the debtor. See. e.g.,
Olmeca, S.A. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 629 F. Supp. 214, 223 .(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (bank
only fiduciary if it acts as customer's agent or trustee).
312. 678 S.W.2d 661, 690 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984). For a discussion of the facts of Farah, see supra
notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
313. State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
314. Id. at 689 (quoting Armendariz v. Mora, 553 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)).
The Farah court stated that these elements established a prima facie case of interference, and that it
then became the burden of the defendant to show its acts were justified or privileged. Id.
315. Id. at 688. The lender in Farah claimed that it was legally justified and privileged to issue
warnings based upon the exercise of contractual rights or upon a financial interest. Id. In this case,
the lender based its actions upon the financing agreement between the parties, under which the
lender had a business interest regarding repayment of the loans. See id. The lender contended that it
only entered into the financing agreement in the first place upon the condition that new management
be put in charge of the company. Id. at 668. The change of management clause was made part of the
agreement in order to protect the lender's interests regarding the loan, and this was the basis of the
argument that the lender was protecting its business interests when it threatened to default the loan if
William Farah were reelected CEO. Id. at 668.
316. Id. at 689.
317. Id. at 690. The court in Farah juxtaposed the benefits the lender obtained in being able to
protect its business interests in the repayment of its loans against the interests of the debtor in having
the ability to elect directors and officers who are competent and who had a high degree of undivided
loyalty to the company. Id. The court indicated that the lender's interference resulted in the election
of officers whose loyalty was divided between the debtor and the lender, and that this resulted in
injury to the interests of the debtor. Id.
NOTE
"was done willfully, intentionally and without just cause or
excuse.'"318 Therefore, the debtor had established a cause of action
for tortious interference.
3 19
Liability for tortious interference requires that the debtor show
that the lender acted with an improper purpose to injure the
debtor's business.3 20 Moreover, in order to hold the lender liable
for tortious interference, the debtor must establish that the lender
did not have a justifiable business interest in mind when it acted.
321
D. PRIMA FACIE TORT
One common-law tort theory that has been raised in lender
liability cases without much success for the debtor is the prima facie
tort. 32 2 To establish a cause of action for prima facie tort, the debtor
must show four elements: (1) that the lender performed an
intentional, lawful act; (2) that the lender intended to injure the
debtor; (3) that the debtor sustained injury; and (4) that the lender
lacked sufficient justification for its actions. 32 3 This cause of action
has been restricted to those cases which fall outside other tort
categories. 324 To prove the prima facie tort, the debtor must show
that the lender acted for no justified purpose of its own. 325 This has
proven to be a difficult burden to meet.
326
In Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 327 the debtor was
a commercial printer who had a line of credit arrangement with the
lender, secured by all of the debtor's accounts receivable. 328 The
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See, e.g., Harsha v. State Say. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 800 (Iowa 1984) (lender not liable
for tortious interference because debtor failed to establish lender had improper objective to benefit its
own company when it refused to loan additional sums).
321. Cf Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 690 (business justification may be outweighed by potential harm
of such interference and if lender's actions are willful and intentional).
322. See Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944, 948-49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(lender not liable for prima facie tort when evidence failed to show intent to injure debtor).
323. Id. at 948. In Shaughnessy the Missouri Court of Appeals stated that the element of malicious
intent to injure carried a heavy burden of proof. Id. at 949. It required more than intent to perform
the act, or some questionable intent to injure the debtor. Id. In this case, the debtor failed to show
that the lender's failure to disburse the remainder of a line of credit was intended to injure the debtor
rather than as a valid business decision regarding the risk the debtor presented, and the prima facie
tort claim, therefore, failed. Id.
324. See, e.g., Printers II, Inc. v. Professionals Publishing, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 767, 774 (S.D.
N.Y. 1985) (prima facie tort cannot be used if evidence fails to sustain the traditional causes of action
alleged), aff'd, 784 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1986).
325. See, e.g., Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 544 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986) (lender not liable for prima facie tort when it acted for business reasons in exercising
contract rights); Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (no
liability for prima facie tort when lender demanded payment on note for valid business reasons).
326. See cases cited supra note 325.
327. 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
328. Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
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debtor executed a promissory note evidencing the debt. 32 9 After the
debtor experienced labor difficulties in its printing plant and
sustained losses, the debtor requested that the note be renewed. 330
The lender did not renew the note and requested that the debtor
provide more collateral to secure additional funds advanced on the
line of credit. 331 On the date the note was due, the lender exercised
its option under the contract to set off the debtor's accounts and to
collect the accounts receivable deposited with the lender. 33 2
The Missouri Court of Appeals stated that the acts of the
lender were all honest in fact exercises of contract rights. 333
According to the agreement signed by the parties in this case, the
lender had the contractual right to call in the loan when it was due,
to request more collateral to secure any further advances, and to set
off the debtor's funds to meet the loan obligation. 334 Because these
were all valid actions under the contract, they did not show actual
intent to injure the debtor which is necessary to establish a claim of
prima facie tort.
335
The Missouri court reasoned that even if the actions of the
lender amounted to a breach of contract, the acts were nonetheless
made with valid business interests in mind, and therefore, no cause
of action in tort existed. 336 Thus, because the actions of the lender
were justified by both the contract and the lender's business
interests, there was no liability for prima facie tort. 337  In
conclusion, the Missouri Court of Appeals stated that without a
showing of the improper intent necessary for prima facie tort, the
debtor must resort to contract remedies. 3 8
329. Id.
330. Id. at 522-23.
331. Id. at 523.
332. Id. at 525.
333. Id. at 544; see U.C.C. S 1-201(19) (1978) (good faith defined as honesty in fact in the
transaction). The court in Rigby stated that when the lender requested additional collateral, it acted
from the honest belief that the continued deterioration of the debtor's operation imperiled the
repayment of the loan about to come due. Rigby, 713 S.W.2d at 534. The court also noted that the
lender honestly believed that the security for the loan was not sufficient when it requested the
additional collateral. Id. Furthermore, the court indicated that the lender had no good faith duty to
renew the loan or forbear enforcement of it, and that the lender did not, therefore, breach any duty
owed to the debtor when it refused to renew the note. Id. at 535.
334. Rigby, 713 S.W.2d at 535.
335. Id. at 543-44.
336. Id. at 545. In reaching the conclusion that the debtor did not have a cause of action for
prima facie tort, the court in Rigby relied on the finding in Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc. Id.; see
Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). In Centerre the court
determined that the bank did not act improperly and that the bank had a valid business interest in
calling the note, and therefore, the debtors could not recover based upon the prima facie tort theory.
Centerre, 705 S.W.2d at 55. Furthermore, the trial court's award of punitive damages to the debtor
was overturned because as a matter of law there was no basis upon which the debtors were entitled to
recover on their claims against the bank. Id.
337. Rigby, 713 S.W.2d at 544-45.
338. Id. at 545. The court in Rigby stated that its previous determinations that the lender had not
breached its duty of good faith under the Code and that it had not made an actionable
NOTE
The burden of proving that the lender acted without any
business justification has proven to be difficult for the debtor in the
prima facie tort.3 39 If the lender's actions are supported by the
terms of the contract, it is likely that the debtor will not be able to
establish that the lender acted with intent to injure the debtor, and
the cause of action for prima facie tort will not succeed.
340
V. CONCLUSION
The concept of good faith is a force to be reckoned with in the
borrower-lender relationship. In terms of contract theory, although
the Uniform Commercial Code provides a narrow definition of
good faith, 341 the parties to the agreement or the court involved
may expand the concept to require that the lender's actions be
objectively reasonable. 342 Despite the fact that the lender probably
retains quite a bit of latitude in enforcing the terms of the
borrower's agreement, courts are not inclined to allow the lender to
use clauses allowing the lender to declare the loan in default as
"swords" for commercial gain, rather than as "shields" against
security impairment, against the debtor. 34 3
By allowing the borrower to sue for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and bad faith breach of
contract, for which the borrower may recover punitive damages,
courts have expanded the protection given to the borrower from
arbitrary lender activity. 344  Furthermore, the application of
common-law theories of tort to the borrower-lender relationship
insures that the debtor will not be subject to capricious actions on
the part of the lender.345
It can be argued that the expansion of the concept of liability
for breach of good faith has introduced too much uncertainty into
the borrower-lender relationship because the concept is too difficult
misrepresentation as to the renewal of a note meant that the actions of the lender were lawful
exercises of contractual rights and, therefore, not actionable. Id. at 544.
339. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
340. See, e.g., Rigby, 713 S.W.2d at 544-45 (exercise of contract rights were valid business
actions and did not show actual intent to injure).
341. See U.C.C 5 1-203 (1978) (obligation of good faith). For the relevant text of section 1-203,
see supra note 9.
342. See, e.g., Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979) (decision to
accelerate must be reasonable in light of the facts). For a discussion of Brown, see supra notes 87-105
and accompanying text.
343. See id. at 1379. For a discussion of the restrictions put on the use of acceleration clauses by
some courts, see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 155-253 and accompanying text.
345. For a discussion of the common-law theories applicable to the borrower-lender
relationship, see supra notes 255-340 and accompanying text.
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to define. 346 The standards to which the lender are held do need to
be carefully defined to provide guidance to lenders, and avoid
unwarranted imposition of large damage awards. 347 Courts which
have used a broader definition of good faith have applied a
standard of reasonableness to the lender's actions, and this
indicates that lenders should be on notice that they will likely be
held to objective standards of behavior in their relationships with
their debtors.
348
346. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
347. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 766 (6th Cir. 1985) (court upheld
damages of $7,500,000 even though claimed excessive by lender because greater than the value of
financially troubled debtor business).
348. See, e.g., Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979) (good faith
requires lender's behavior be reasonable under the facts). For a discussion of the objective standard
applied in the debtor and creditor relationship, see supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
314
